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Abstract  
 
Debates about human cloning are typically argued within a framework of individual 
rights and justice that promote a particular view of human independence. As a result, the 
cloning debate is impoverished because it fails to adequately consider human 
interdependence. Rather than considering whether we have a right to clone, feminist care 
ethics offers the question, is it caring to clone? To explore questions of social and 
political care ethics within the cloning debate, this thesis examines two contemporary 
speculative novels, Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) and Kazuo Ishiguro’s 
Never Let Me Go (2005), which represent uses of human cloning that function as an 
ineffective cure for the social and political care that is missing in the U.S. and the U.K. 
These novels also suggest that the ethics of care as a social and political theory may be 
advanced by broadening civic discourse to involve the arts and humanities.   
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Cloning, Liberal Rights, and the Need for a Care Framework 
 
Frances Fukuyama, a well known American philosopher and political economist who is a 
strong opponent of cloning, writes in Our Posthuman Future, “The language of rights has 
become, in the modern world, the only shared and widely intelligible vocabulary we have 
for talking about ultimate human goods or ends, and in particular, those collective goods 
or ends that are the stuff of politics” (108). Through my examination of feminist care 
ethics and speculative fiction about human cloning, I challenge Fukuyama’s assertion that 
the language of rights is, or should be, our only common political vocabulary from which 
to talk about ultimate human goods and ends. All societies and all individuals owe their 
existence as well as their flourishing to some form of care and carework, performed by 
someone. Care is required for survival and while it is not performed by all, it is certainly 
experienced by all at some point in their lives. Given this shared experience, it makes 
sense that the language of care is common, relevant, and intelligible to every person. The 
larger challenge, as articulated by many care scholars, is making the vocabularies, 
practices, and values of care relevant to social and political institutions.  
 In this thesis, I show how a social and political conception of feminist care ethics 
is needed in order to fully consider the ramifications of cloning technology in both the 
present and future. I distinguish between three different applications of care ethics: a 
personal/familial ethic of care, in which care values and practices take place in the home; 
a social ethic of care, where the needs for care and creative solutions for these needs are 
articulated by civic society, defined as the realm in between the individual/family unit 
and the government; and finally a political ethic of care, where government supports the 
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needs for care in the other two realms through law and policy. When we fail to value the 
ideals and practices of care in any one of these three realms, we live in a world in which 
justice and liberal values cannot fully flourish. In the first chapter I offer a discussion of 
challenges by care ethics scholars of liberal theories of justice. These justice-based 
theories serve as the primary basis for bioethics investigations into social and political 
issues concerning the uses of biotechnology.  Because the ethics of care pays attention 
not only to human flourishing, but also to non-human flourishing through its broad 
inclusivity of human interaction with the environment and animals, it allows for an 
investigation of the question—what makes us human?—a particularly relevant question 
in the cloning debate.  
Care is broadly defined as “a species activity that includes everything that we do 
to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. 
That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to 
interweave in a complex, life sustaining web” (Tronto 1993a, 142). In contrast to liberal 
political and philosophical theories, the feminist ethic of care offers a contemporary 
account of how we can learn to care for the “Other.” The concept of the Other is built in 
contrast to the self, and is considered a “fundamental category of human thought . . . 
[and] no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the ‘Other’” (de 
Beauvoir 29). In the case of human cloning, the “One” is humanity, and the “Other” is 
the clone. Through this concept of the Other, there is a connection between feminist 
thought and the cloning debate, articulated in fears that clones will be fundamentally 
different from humans, a thought echoed in history in the metaphysical relationship of 
men as opposed to women.  
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Included in this first chapter on care ethics is the foundational tenets of the theory 
as it has been articulated in book-length works by feminist scholars including Carol 
Gilligan, Sara Ruddick, Eva Feder Kittay, Annette Baier, Nel Noddings, Joan Tronto, 
Selma Sevenhuijsen, and Virginia Held; some of the major critiques of liberal theory by 
these scholars; and finally, a section describing the main arguments in the debate over 
human cloning and how a care ethics approach might respond to them.   
 The second chapter of this thesis examines two contemporary speculative novels: 
Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) and Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go 
(2005). These novels help to demonstrate the need for increased attention to the problems 
of care in Western societies, as well as how our current debate over human cloning is an 
impoverished one without a care ethics approach. The social landscape of these narratives 
show how cloning is imagined as a cure for problems of care in contemporary Western 
societies, including the United States and Great Britain. These novels portray cloning as a 
technology that is developed roughly in the last half of the twentieth century, with the full 
implications of cloning taking place in either our current time or in the near future. They 
point out how cloning is misused according to the social and moral landscape of a 
particular historical moment—our historical moment. These novels can be termed 
“speculative fiction,” a sort of hybrid genre that encompasses utopian, dystopian, sci-fi, 
and fantasy novels with particular characteristics that I describe below. My critique of 
these novels also involves questioning how the narrative of the texts and the characters’ 
actions and thoughts reflect some of the potentially disturbing consequences of 
contemporary liberalism and the ethical system that underlies the uses of technological 
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innovation in modern biology. I conclude that the cloning cure for care is ultimately 
doomed to failure because it is not used within a broader vision of social care.  
Cloning and Its Uses 
 
For this thesis, I am not concerned with the actual process of cloning; both reproductive 
cloning and research cloning are practiced in labs today and both are controversial.1   
Also associated with human cloning, and even more controversial, is genetic 
manipulation of cloned embryos. “Somatic” manipulation involves manipulating strand
of DNA of an embryo so that the person produced would have modified genetic 
the modifications would not be transferred to future generations. “Germline” 
manipulation changes the chromosomes of the embryo so future generations would als
exhibit the same traits. Both types of genetic manipulation are practiced in labs on 
animals for research purposes;
s 
traits, but 
o 
 however,  
                                                
articles proposing [human germline manipulation] are appearing with 
increased frequency. In mice and other animals that have been employed 
as models for human biology, germline modification has actually proved 
technically easier than somatic manipulation . . . given what has been 
accomplished in animals and the availability of in vitro fertilization, there 
appears to be no technical obstacles to initiating germline modification 
experiments in humans. (Council for Responsible Genetics) 
 
 
1 Both processes are similar.  To clone a human, a scientist would: obtain an egg cell from a female; 
remove the nuclear DNA from the egg cell to produce an enucleated egg; insert the nucleus of a donor 
adult cell into the enucleated egg to produce a reconstructed egg; activate the reconstructed egg with 
chemicals or electric current in vitro to stimulate the reconstructed egg to commence cell division; initiate 
development of the activated, reconstructed egg (zygote) to a suitable stage of early embryonic 
development in vitro; then transfer the embryo to the uterus of a female host that has been suitably 
prepared to receive it.  To harvest stem cells from a cloned embryo, instead of implanting the embryo, 
scientists remove them from the embryo after it has grown to the 100‐200 cell stage and then discard the 
remainder (President’s Council on Bioethics).  Recent breakthroughs in stem cell research indicate the 
possibility for stem cells to be derived from adult skin cells, thereby avoiding the ethical conundrum of 
extracting stem cells from embryos. 
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When we think of human cloning, it seems unlikely in the real world; however, it 
is not the far-fetched fantasy that many in the public would like to think. Additionally, 
the ethical dilemmas of cloning are not apparent to everyone, as is evidenced in some of 
the recent attempts to bring about the appearance of the world’s first clone. In 2001, for 
example, Clonaid, the biotech company linked to the Raelian cult,2  claimed the 
successful birth of the first clone, a baby girl, who supposedly now lives in Israel; 
however, they have never produced the baby or any documentation of the science 
employed (CNN.com). Mark Hunt, a Virginia state representative and lawyer, gave 
Clonaid over $500,000 to produce a clone of his dead son, Andrew, a 10 month old baby 
who died in 1999 during a heart surgery (Lauria). His motivation for attempting to clone 
the baby was to assuage the grief he and his wife felt over their child’s death. Dr. Richard 
Seed, a former Harvard professor, proclaimed in December 1997 that he intended, with 
Kentucky fertility expert Panayiotis Zavos and Italian “maverick” fertility doctor 
Severino Antinori, to set up a cloning lab in international waters to avoid any possible 
government or legal intervention (Caplan). These are examples of real-life persons who 
do not believe it is anyone else’s business if they should decide to produce a clone; yet 
when their stories hit the media, a storm of disapproval and fear ignites the public. 
Richard Dawkins articulates these fears, asking “who is most likely to get themselves 
cloned? A nice person like you? Or someone with power and influence like Saddam 
Hussein? A hero we’d all like to see more of, like David Attenborough? Or someone who 
can pay, like Rupert Murdoch?” (55). Despite the popular argument that cloning is part 
                                                 
2 The Raelian Cult believes that extraterrestrial aliens created human life on earth, and believe humanity’s 
mission on earth is to develop cloning technology as a path to eternal life.  (See International Raelian 
Movement, 2005). 
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and parcel of our constitutional rights to privacy and reproductive freedom, it is a divisive 
and controversial issue in the press and with the public. 
In biotechnology, there are two ways to delineate the uses of human cloning, both 
of which are relevant to this thesis. The first, and the one most often discussed in the 
cloning debate, is its use as a reproductive technology for prospective parents (or the 
singular, “parent”). The other purpose of cloning technology could be called “laboratory 
cloning”—cloning in the lab to produce a copy of a person for reasons other than 
reproduction in the family. The most commonly stated desired use for laboratory cloning 
is stem cell research, which has the potential for curing diseases, a use that is 
problematized by Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go, in which public research 
programs develop clone children for organ harvesting.  
Cloning for reasons other than reproduction of children is seldom discussed in 
academia or on ethics panels; possibly, one such use would be to create a transgenic 
human, which Crake does in Oryx and Crake. This reason for cloning is frequently 
denied by scientists as a motive and by ethicists as a desirable possibility, yet the 
reproductive uses for cloning are clearly not a viable possibility without extensive 
research and trials of cloning in the lab. In addition, transgenic animals are not 
uncommon in laboratory research, so a transgenic human, in theory, is not impossible.3  
While it might be argued that even laboratory cloning will require a mother to carry a 
                                                 
3 Transgenic mice that express human genes are frequently used in medical research.  In addition to 
research uses, transgenic animals received a lot of attention in the art world in 2002.  Eduardo Kac, an 
artist from Chicago, produced a transgenic rabbit, which expressed a jellyfish gene that made the rabbit 
glow iridescent green in ultraviolet light.  Kac asserts that artists are looking for new mediums for their 
work, and transgenics is an appropriate artistic medium for investigating questions concerning 
biotechnology (see Kac, 2003).   
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cloned embryo to term, thereby making the product of cloning a private matter, the 
commodification of childbirth through ovum sales and surrogacy contracts enables 
laboratories to completely control the cloning process from embryo creation to baby 
delivery.  
There may also be the possibility in the near future for artificial wombs, 
eliminating the need for a gestational mother.4  In today’s global economy, it is entirely 
possible for a corporation or a private laboratory to have a baby. Just because it hasn’t 
happened yet, however, does not mean that it will not happen at all. Lori Andrews, a 
lawyer who specializes in biotechnology, detects  
a world of difference between reproductive technologies (in-vitro 
fertilization, egg donation, sperm donation, or surrogate motherhood), 
which allow couples to make up for a missing ingredient in the normal 
reproductive process, and the technologies now being proposed to let dead 
men beget children, to reanimate dead fetuses, and to create children with 
only one genetic parent. The former techniques meet existing needs; the 
latter create needs and try to shoehorn them into the existing category of 
women’s reproductive choice. (Andrews 256)  
 
Atwood and Ishiguro add the creation of new species and organ harvesting to Andrews’ 
list. How are we to know whether cloning research in private labs is undertaken for 
widely-accepted humanitarian reasons or if they are a smokescreen for radical, selfish or 
inhumane uses?  
                                                 
4 Dr. Scott Gelfand of Oklahoma State University speculates that in the future, if artificial wombs are safe 
and effective, they could mean that women would no longer need maternity leave from their jobs, and 
employers would be reluctant to allow extended leaves for pregnancy and childbirth.  Another 
speculation offered is that they may be insisted upon by health insurance companies to “promote safer 
environments than natural wombs which can be invaded by drugs and alcohol from a mother’s body” 
(McKie, 2002).  This would effectively promote a deeper intrusion of science and technology into women’s 
control of their own bodies than ever before.  
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Regardless of the uses to which cloning is applied, the technology to create a clone is the 
same. And there is no ban on cloning in the U.S., although some states have passed laws 
banning reproductive or research-based cloning. There is also a federal law which 
prohibits federal funds to be used for cloning research; however, it does not prohibit 
private funding. My concern is that if cloning continues to be developed privately, then 
the uses for it will be decided by scientists and private funders, not civil society—the area 
of collective, social action that exists in between the family and the state, and a 
foundational organizational feature of a democratic society. This raises some serious 
questions about how much control governments and citizens have over the applications of 
cloning. Private funding essentially means that the uses of cloning and the motivation 
behind research may be hidden, increasing the likelihood that the birth of the first clone 
will come before we expect it, and the fate of the first clone will be determined not within 
a public conception of care but a private motivation of use that may or may not be caring.  
In the liberal conception, questions about cloning are commonly framed as, “do 
we have a right to clone?”5  Political and ethical debates about reproductive freedom 
make this question a complicated one. Less common is the question framed as, “is it 
caring to clone?” Feminist philosophers of care ethics, such as Virginia Held, claim that 
the ethics of care is suitable for both men and women, valuable for examining global 
issues, relevant to social problems, and critical of the encroachment of the market into 
every aspect of life; however, often care ethics is seen as an appropriate ethic for personal 
                                                 
5 The “we” here could refer to either individuals (reproductive freedom) or scientists; the “freedom of 
scientific research” movement has its own world congress and declaration that claims nations have a 
moral responsibility to support various types of biotechnological research, including cloning. See Institute 
for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/489/. 
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relations or for the family, more relevant for women than for men, and incompatible with 
freedom. This thesis attempts to situate the ethics of care as a preferable theory for social 
and political purposes within such a broad and far reaching contemporary social and 
political issue—human cloning.    
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Chapter 1: Care Critiques of Liberalism, Care Theory, and Cloning 
Technology 
 
The cloning question—its possibility or fact—has undergone serious debate amongst 
philosophers, politicians, scientists, and even the general public in the late 20th and early 
21st centuries. One can consult a large number of sources that outline the pro and con 
arguments that lie at the core of questions generated by the possibility for cloning 
humans. Most recent speculations, however, strongly imply that the “should we?” 
question is quickly becoming irrelevant. The Institute of Advanced Study at the United 
Nations University submitted a report to the United Nations in October 2007 titled, “Is 
Human Reproductive Cloning Inevitable: Future Options for UN Governance.” In the 
preface to the report, the cloning issue is made explicit; scientists around the world 
“predict that the birth of a human clone is inevitable” (Kuppuswamy, Macer, Serbulea, 
and Tobin 2). Both British and American scientists have produced embryos from cloning, 
although no embryos have been implanted for gestation, and so far have only lived in the 
lab for a few days (Sample). Other writers also speculate whether the birth of a human 
clone has already taken place, or when its occurrence comes in the near future whether 
our ethical responses to it will come too late. According to Craig Venter, one of the top 
researchers of the human genome in the U.S., no area of modern science starts “with 
ethical discussions before the first experiment [is] done” (quoted in Connor 2008). With 
this kind of attitude, the “too late” scenario appears to be inevitable.  
 This kind of reactive approach is common in current political and legal debates 
surrounding biotechnology. Legal measures do exist to protest unjust or unfair patents on 
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genetic materials; however, David Resnick claims that when we examine the values 
expressed in legal decisions, it becomes clear that the courts are aligned with economic 
values that promote the biotechnology industry, often to the detriment of personal rights 
and liberties (153). Furthermore, violations of rights in biotechnology cases are expensive 
and time consuming to deal with in the court system. In controversial decisions, it is 
common for judges to assert that it is the role of legislators to determine bans on 
particular types of research. In the U.S., there is no ban on human cloning. Although a 
pair of bills passed through the U.S. House of Representatives in 2001 and 2003, both 
failed to pass in the U.S. Senate. As of March 2008, a revised version of the previous bill 
proposing to ban human cloning is being proposed by the House. 
 Some scholars claim that the route to public acceptance of cloning will take the 
same path as artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization in the late twentieth century. 
Initial shock and horror is replaced by curiosity, then experimentation, and then scientific 
success and public acceptance. In Pandora’s Baby (2005), Robin Marantz Henig traces 
the ethical and political debates that raged over IVF technology during the 1970s. Back 
then, the debate raised questions like, “Would successful in vitro fertilization demand a 
reassessment of qualities so central to our humanity—a sense of doom and destiny, our 
understanding of who we are and where we are headed, our definitions of parents, 
children, love, sex, generation—that its very existence would threaten our collective 
soul? These questions may seem overdramatic today, unless you replace ‘in vitro 
fertilization’ with ‘human cloning’” (15). The ethical issues of IVF, as well as their 
questionable applications, are still with us. Despite public acceptance of IVF as a 
reproductive technology, its development paved the way for scientists to continue 
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experimentation on human reproductive material—eggs and sperm. There is a divide 
between acceptable use of the technology in the public realm as a method of 
reproduction, and the private uses of the technology in the laboratory. If we follow the 
logic of the public acceptability argument down its slippery slope, then eventually we 
might genetically engineer humanity right out of existence. This possibility is presented 
in Oryx and Crake, as I shall explain later.  
 The majority of arguments for or against cloning, regardless of how it will be 
used, are presented within a liberal conception of individual rights. Concerns of care are 
rarely addressed. Before discussing specific arguments commonly offered in the debate 
over cloning, an outline of the ethics of care and its critiques of liberal theory is in order. 
Contemporary liberalism is basically the overall economic, political, and philosophical 
framework of the contemporary Western world, and it follows that the cloning debate is 
argued most frequently within the boundaries of that rhetorical world. Liberalism can be 
defined as “a political programme or ideology whose goals include most prominently the 
diffusion, deepening and preservation of constitutional democracy, limited government, 
individual liberty, and those basic human and civil rights which are instrumental to any 
decent human existence” (Thorsen and Lie 7). Liberal theory begins with the assertion 
that justice is the first virtue of social institutions (Rawls, 1971/99, 3). The primary 
features of liberal justice theory also include a particular conception of persons as 
rational, self interested, and autonomous, as well as reliant on reasoned judgment, 
abstract principles, and universality.  
 The major features of the ethics of care include a conception of persons as social 
and relational, which forms the basis of care critiques of liberal autonomy. Second, where 
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liberal theory is reliant on abstract principles and universality, care ethics is grounded in 
contextuality and is concerned with the needs of particular persons. Equal rights, both 
human and civil, are important to both liberal theory and care ethics; however, care ethics 
recognizes that relationships are often not characterized by equality and have the 
potential to be oppressive in ways that are not obvious to either the oppressor or the 
oppressed. Third, power relations are an important consideration for care theorists who 
draw attention to ways in which care is interfered with or even damaged by power 
relationships. While liberal theory assumes that care takes place in families, a private 
realm of life often outside of the concerns of politics or justice, care ethics scholars 
challenge this assumption. They point out that not only is justice within the family an 
important part of building a caring society, so is learning to value and support carework 
that is performed, typically by women, both inside and outside of the home. Finally, 
while justice and fairness are important, Virginia Held argues that care is the primary 
value; indeed, she writes, “there can be care without justice, but there can be no justice 
without care” (134).   
 One of the strongest critiques of liberal values within the ethics of care comes 
from scholars who challenge its conception of autonomy. The conception of the liberal 
self, an autonomous agent who is self-governing and self-determining, occupies a central 
role in liberal theory, including Kantian moral philosophy and the utilitarian liberalism of 
John Stuart Mill. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states, “Put most simply, to 
be autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, 
conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are 
part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self” (Christman). Liberal 
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autonomy assumes that we are self-interested individuals who are free to choose our 
conception of the good life free from outside forces.  
 Feminist scholars, particularly those who focus on care ethics, claim that this 
notion of autonomy is false and misleading. Relational autonomy theories contest the 
individualistic and atomized notion of human moral life found in the liberal conception of 
autonomy. Relational autonomy is better understood as a sort of relational negotiation, 
where people recognize how their relationships with others, as well as the social world in 
which they make their personal choices, greatly affect how they choose to live. As 
relationships change and our society changes, so does our autonomy. It is as flexible and 
constantly changing as we ourselves are, rather than a state of being we reach at 
adulthood and maintain throughout our adult lives. Relational autonomy is characterized 
by the conviction that persons are socially embedded and function as agents whose 
identities are formed within a context of social relationships and are shaped by social 
determinants (Mackenzie and Stoljar 4). The bedrock of relational autonomy is a 
conception of the self—the “social self”—that stands in contrast to the “independent self” 
of justice-based political and moral theories. Rather than viewing individuals as 
independent, the concept of the social self emphasizes relations that come before and 
after one’s existence. The social self is produced through interaction with others.  
In more intimate relations, as between friends and family, the social self “focuses 
moral concern more on the qualities and activities appropriate to care of others than on 
legitimizing individual rights as the means for protecting individuals from one another” 
(Barclay 59). Interaction with others is not an option for anyone to reject; from a moral 
standpoint, caring relations are preferable to non-caring ones for both personal and social 
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reasons. From birth until death, we live in a matrix of interpersonal relationships, which 
in many ways work to both enhance and inhibit our autonomy, our sense of ourselves, 
and how we choose to live. Relational autonomy is the process by which we mediate 
these relations—both personal and social—to determine our values, ends, and actions. 
Since we are relational by default, our autonomy is also relational. 
A second feminist critique of liberal theories is that they were developed in a 
patriarchal framework that separated concerns of the public and private spheres. Carol 
Gilligan’s 1982 critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s work on moral psychology and her 
contrasting study of women’s moral development, In A Different Voice, articulates the 
need for a morality grounded in feminist values in contrast to Kantian based moral 
theories that emphasize autonomy and rights. Her intent is to demonstrate  
the centrality of the concepts of responsibility and care in women’s 
constructions of the moral domain, to indicate the close tie in women’s 
thinking between conceptions of the self and conceptions of morality, and 
finally, to argue the need for an expanded developmental theory that would 
include, rather than rule out from developmental consideration, the 
difference in the feminine voice. (Gilligan 1997, 582)  
 
Gilligan’s work functioned to launch expanded studies of feminist care ethics, which has 
undergone rigorous critical debates among feminist and non-feminist scholars for the past 
25 years. Early critiques of liberal theory focused on calling attention to the potential 
social and political value of carework traditionally performed by women in the private 
home.  
 Early formulations of care ethics were somewhat dominated by motherhood as a 
concrete representation of what care ethics entailed. To demonstrate the gulf between the 
abstract concepts of liberalism and the concrete application of care ethics, Sara Ruddick’s 
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Maternal Thinking (1989) articulates a process of critical thought that develops when 
mothers engage in caring work with children. According to Ruddick, “a mother caring for 
children engages in a discipline,” described much like any other discipline that involves 
establishing criteria for failure and success, prioritization of responsibilities, identifying 
virtues required of the work, evaluating progress, developing attitudes and making value 
judgments (24). Differences in disciplinary thought, whether they are scientific, critical, 
religious, or maternal, according to Ruddick, is how they will “distinguish true from 
false, will take some matters on faith, others on evidence, will judge evidence inadequate 
or faith misplaced” (16). The end goal of feminist maternal thinking is to foster 
preservation, growth, and social acceptability of children through works of preservative 
love, nurturance, and training (17). The thrust of Ruddick’s work is to point out that war 
and violence are antithetical to the lifework of every mother; therefore, it is in every 
mother’s interest to resist all forms of violence. The critical thought developed in the 
work of motherhood, according to Ruddick, is the same as feminist peace politics: 
“peacemakers create a communal suspicion of violence, a climate in which peace is 
desired, a way of living in which it is possible to learn and to practice nonviolent 
resistance and strategies of reconciliation. This description of peacemaking is a 
description of mothering” (Ruddick 244). Taken further, maternal thinking is not 
restricted to mothers, but is applicable to anyone who engages in carework for another 
person. Men are just as capable as women to develop the types of concrete thinking that 
evolve from practices of carework. Ruddick was among the first to develop a solid 
theoretical framework for care ethics. Maternal Thinking demonstrates that caring values, 
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developed through concrete practices of care, are critical to the political and social 
spheres.  
Eva Feder Kittay also recognizes the potential in the mother/child relationship as 
a model for social and political practices. Kittay drives the point that traditional ethics 
and liberal theory assume that relationships between persons are equal and voluntary, 
when in reality, many of our relations are not chosen, nor are they equal. She sees 
“maternal practice as a paradigm for moral relations between two individuals who are not 
equally situated from the perspective of individual-based equality” (275). In contrast to 
liberal scholars such as John Rawls, whose philosophy requires that we remove our 
understandings of our selves in order to come to a fair conception of justice,6  Kittay’s 
conception of connection-based equality proposes that we see everyone as some mother’s 
child. With this understanding, we can recognize our entitlements to care when it is 
needed, as well as our entitlements to a socially supportive caring situation in the event 
we are called upon to give care to another (273). Kittay names her perspective the 
“vulnerability model” of care ethics, emphasizing the need both for care in society as 
well as for the dependent and the dependency worker, and highlighting the need for 
moral theories to recognize unequal distributions of power. Where Kittay’s theory fails as 
a larger social and political ethic of care for cloning is evident in Ishiguro’s Never Let Me 
Go. Kittay claims that “being a mother’s child gives one a claim to equality” (1999, 25). 
Ishiguro’s clones have no mothers and are exploited by their ‘guardians’ through an 
                                                 
6 In John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, in order to come to a fair conception of justice, representative 
member s of a society must put themselves behind a “veil of ignorance,” disregarding their actual 
positions in life (gender, class, religion, etc.).  Only by ignoring our conceptions of the self will we come to 
a fair conclusion of what justice requires (Rawls 1971/1997). 
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oppressive application of the ethic of care. While Kittay is concerned with power 
relationships, she seems to be concerned mainly with genetic relationships and 
responsibilities of the greater society to ensure that families are able to take care of their 
children, even children who have more than typical dependencies. When cloning 
confuses family relationships, particularly if cloning should occur outside of reproductive 
choice, a social and political care ethic is necessary for guiding how a cloned child will 
be treated in personal relationships as well as social relationships. 
Care ethics is firmly grounded in the context of power relations that is often 
unrecognized in liberal theory. Where liberal theory assumes universal application of 
justice in the public realm separate from the private realm, Joan Tronto focuses carefully 
on power relations and makes a strong case for extending the ethics of care out of the 
personal and into the political in Moral Boundaries (1993a), providing a comprehensive 
definition of the values and practices necessary to a more complete political conception 
for care ethics. Tronto explains how moral arguments made within particular historical, 
social and cultural contexts functioned to block the effectiveness of women’s moral 
reasoning, which led to “moral boundaries” set between men and women in the 18th 
century. Tronto connects what was considered women’s morality—a deficient moral 
sense for the public realm—to the same kind of thinking that characterized the Scottish 
Enlightenment, which was greatly influential to philosophy and politics during the late 
eighteenth century. The Scottish Enlightenment, like women’s moral voices, exhibited 
“senses of connection, moral sensibility, attachment to others and to community” (1993a, 
57). In this way, Tronto effectively argues that women’s morality is not a biological, 
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psychological, or cultural connection women had due to their “natural” qualities or their 
historical relegation to the private sphere.  
 According to Tronto, care is an integral part of human moral life, and a “crucial 
concept for an adequate theory of how we might make human societies more moral” 
(1993a, 154). Care ethics functions as a contextual moral theory, rather than a universal 
moral theory. The liberal assumption of universality—that abstract rules cover a wide 
variety of contexts and are applicable for everyone—may work well for large nations 
with a diverse population; abstract rules of conduct can be made universal and are able to 
avoid conflicts over religious or cultural differences in moral judgment. Yet, feminist 
critiques of universal theories demonstrate how universality functions to keep the private 
and public spheres separate, a boundary that is unacceptable (Tronto 1993a, 29).  
Tronto articulates care as an ethic that is applicable for both public and private 
spheres. In developing a political conception of care ethics that moves beyond this 
public/private boundary, Tronto defines care as a set of four phases, or practices: caring 
about, taking care of, care-giving, and care-receiving. Out of these four elements of the 
practices of care, the four moral values of the ethic of care are: attentiveness, 
responsibility, competence, and responsiveness (1993a, ch4). These four values of care—
attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness—form the foundation of 
Tronto’s political theory of care. Later, when I evaluate the social and political 
characteristics of care in Oryx and Crake and Never Let Me Go, I will use these four 
values of care as a critical part of my analysis.  
Tronto also identifies possible problems inherent in the care ethics framework, 
including difficulties with properly assessing human needs, the possibility of difficulties 
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arising from attitudes of paternalism and parochialism, the need to minimize detached 
kinds of caring, associating those who need care as “others,” and the historical 
devaluation of care and carework that may hamper transforming care into a social and 
political ethic. Nevertheless, Tronto argues that “despite the intractability of the problems 
of otherness, privilege, and paternalism, I suggest that a moral theory that can recognize 
and identify these issues is preferable to a moral theory that, because it presumes all 
people are equal, is unable even to recognize them” (1993a, 147). For Tronto, as well as 
other care philosophers, to conceive of care as an integral element of our moral terrain we 
must reconceive some of our most deeply held assumptions about human nature and 
recognize that government intervention in care—traditionally conceived of as a private 
realm of life—may be necessary for promoting care in the personal/familial and social 
realms.  
 The practices of care are complemented by values of care—articulated by Tronto 
as attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness. Care ethics involves 
both practices and values, and cannot operate effectively without both. Many feminist 
philosophers in care ethics agree that while current conceptions of feminist morality 
derive from “feminine” values associated with historical female practices of caring for 
family in the private home, an adequate moral framework must incorporate values that 
are a cooperative project of men and women’s insights. Annette Baier’s work in Moral 
Prejudices (1994) suggests that the ethic of care should be modeled with the value of 
trust as a primary consideration. In direct contrast to contractual relationships, in which 
conditions must be set forth in advance for the rights and responsibilities of each party, 
trusting relationships, such as those modeled on friendship, provide an alternative moral 
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paradigm to contract-based theories. Trust needs to be cultivated, responded to with 
critical reflection, and given careful attention. In addition to trust, according to Baier, we 
also must recognize that there will be times when we cannot trust, as well as times when 
we must learn to forgive and be forgiven. Baier’s caring ethical approach to trust forms a 
meta-ethical account of what a caring society would value as an alternative to the 
contract.  
 While Baier makes suggestions for the development of social and political care 
ethics in part of her book, a majority of her work forms a comprehensive critique of 
liberal moralism, in particular Kantian ethics. In the chapter, “How Can Individualists 
Share Responsibility?” Baier writes, “It is very easy for a citizen in a large nation like 
this one to wash her hands of any responsibility for any decision taken by any public 
officials. Especially when one deplores a particular decision . . . responsibility is 
conveniently passed along to those with a taste for the exercise of power” (254). This 
very scenario is played out in Oryx and Crake, as Jimmy continually defers to Crake’s 
scientific knowledge and personal opinion about human nature and the organization of 
society. As Snowman, putatively alone on the earth after a global disaster, he cries out, 
“You did this!” (Atwood 12). We aren’t sure if he is speaking to his dead friend Crake, or 
to himself as he realizes his complicity in creating the apocalypse. “ ‘I didn’t do it on 
purpose,’ he says, in the sniveling child’s voice he reverts to in this mood. ‘Things 
happened, I had no idea, it was out of my control! What could I have done?’ ” (Atwood 
45). Yet throughout the narrative there are places in which it is clear that Jimmy did have 
opportunities to change the course of events. Reasons why Jimmy did not, or rather could 
22 
 
 
not, act effectively for change are directly related to the impoverished caring he received 
and learned as a child, both from his parents and from the society in which he grew up.  
In order to live in a caring society, we have to care enough about our society to 
take responsibility for how decisions are made and executed. Baier favors a more 
communitarian conception of the relationship between individuals and the society they 
live in. “Passive citizenship,” characterized as “clinging to the idea that moral 
responsibility must divide without remainder into the bit that is mine and not yours and 
the other bits that belong exclusively to other specific individuals” will only result in 
limiting the “sorts of shared action we engage in, [limiting] our ability to reform our 
inherited schemes of cooperation for the better” (266). In this sense, Baier’s ethic of care 
is grounded in a conception of care as a value that demonstrates how to encourage an 
active and public ethic of care about our society and all the people who live in it, 
including “Others” whom we do not know.  
Selma Sevenhuijsen’s work on care and citizenship firmly establishes the link 
between the three realms of care—personal/familial, social, and political, and defines 
what “active citizenship” looks like. Sevenhuijsen describes the current argument for 
“new democratic practices” relevant to the shifting locations of government power in 
global society. The notion of a “controlling and steering government should be replaced 
by the idea of a responsive, supportive and organizing government, resulting in a two-
way traffic in politics” (180). She claims that this type of reciprocal politics will result in 
the “intertwinement” of the social and the political. Civic society becomes a place to  
exchange narratives of what counts in [people’s] lives and become 
acquainted with the stories of others. In this way, they will arrive at 
systems of shared meanings that will make sustainable forms of co-
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existence possible . . . policymakers, as people who occupy positions of 
social responsibility, have the task of actively and responsively reacting to 
what they can learn from this about matters which are relevant for their 
institutional practices. (180)  
 
Sevenhuijsen observes that practices of care are being “relocated” in a similar 
way. Care is moving from being women-centered to being a shared responsibility 
with men. Also, care is being moved from inside the private home to the social 
and political realms, as people articulate their needs for care or support of care-
work in civic life. A third relocation is occurring in the medical world, where 
private medical care is no longer affordable or accessible, raising civic concerns 
about quality of life as people live longer and need long-term care. As a result of 
the needs for care and growing practices of active citizenship, values and 
practices of care will become an integral part of social and political organization. 
While Sevenhuijsen’s approach focuses on concrete needs for physical care, 
including day care and elder care, I argue that her approach towards the link 
between active citizenship and the values of care can contribute to developing a 
broad conception of care ethics that can be applied to a wide variety of human 
concerns, including such issues as human cloning.  
Nel Noddings agrees that “caring about” is a prerequisite to “caring for.” 
Noddings’ work takes a bottom-up approach, emphasizing the need for education of 
children to involve learning how to “care about.” An education stressing care would 
promote its value in personal relationships, its application in civic society, and its policy 
in government. While rights are important and should not be rejected, Noddings points 
out that needs have served as the historical basis for rights: “A group expresses a need as 
24 
 
 
a demand for a right. The audience that is addressed listens and has the power to act (or 
acknowledges that the demanding group has the power to seize what it wants), and it 
grants the right, sometimes after a bloody struggle” (55). According to Noddings, the 
traditional liberal conception of persons as rights-bearers is faulty; a more realistic 
approach is one that views persons as “organisms needing care” (56). Noddings contrasts 
Rawls’ Original Position with the “original condition” of vulnerability as an infant with 
needs addressed in the home. Noddings admits that this approach is subject to critique—
not all homes are good ones, and not all needs are met because they can often conflict; 
however, “best practices” of care in the home can translate to the public sphere in order 
to create a more caring society with institutions that promote policies more in line with 
real life as it is lived by real people, rather than ones based on a faulty view of persons as 
rational, autonomous (in the liberal sense), and only self-interested.  
This liberal conception of persons, argues Virginia Held, “leads to a narrowing of 
the gap between model and reality and to the wider acceptance of the assumption of 
indifference as standard and appropriate—not only as an assumption but as a guide” (83). 
In other words, these liberal assumptions teach us to be uncaring towards other persons 
with whom we are not closely and emotionally connected. With this view, passive 
citizenship and non-interference becomes an ideal to strive towards—a way to “respect” 
the rights of others. Care ethics scholars claim that this perspective is fine for certain 
domains, such as criminal law; however, “the assumptions and conceptions of liberal 
individualism do not serve us well in many of our other experiences as human persons in 
a large variety of relationships and that [care] perspectives should also inform our views 
of the legal and the political” (Held 88). While current conceptions of care ethics 
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maintain the critique of justice frameworks, very few care ethics scholars think that care 
and justice are incompatible with each other, or that one should be subsumed under the 
other. In fact, many believe that we cannot have one without the other. Injustices can be 
found in contexts of care, and care scholars are quite aware of the inequalities between 
those who have the capabilities to provide care and those who are in need of care. 
Recognizing the right to receive care free of oppressive circumstances as a valid political 
claim is one example of how care and justice frameworks are mutually supportive. Justice 
and care can work in tandem to promote a caring society in which everyone still has the 
full rights and responsibilities of citizens in a democratic state. 
Virginia Held’s The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (2006) is the 
most recent book-length publication on care ethics, and her work in this text provides an 
excellent overview of the state of the theory. Most importantly, Held’s position asserts 
that care is more important than justice, and “though justice is surely among the most 
important moral values, much life has gone on without it, and much of that life has had 
moderately good aspects” (71). Additionally, care is a more basic human value, because 
we can have care without justice; we cannot have justice without care. Some critics attack 
this view by claiming that care approaches will result in oppressive government policies 
against citizens who do not wish to care. This critique is based on the liberal assumption 
that we should not be interfered with by others—that our decisions are not or should not 
be tempered by outside interference—a view that is conceptually different than the 
relational emphasis in a care ethics approach. 
 Care ethics as a whole does not offer such a narrow view by throwing justice and 
concerns for rights out the window. Furthermore, a feminist care ethic is not necessarily 
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composed of paternalistic or maternalistic qualities and values. Gilligan reminds us of the 
crucial distinction between a feminine ethic of care and a feminist ethic of care:  
Care as a feminine ethic is an ethic of special obligations and interpersonal 
relationships. Selflessness or self-sacrifice is built into the very definition 
of care when caring is premised on an opposition between relationships and 
self-development. A feminist ethic of care is an ethic of the relational world 
as that world appears within a patriarchal social order: that is, a world 
apart, separated politically and psychologically from a realm of individual 
autonomy and freedom which is the realm of justice and contractual 
obligation. (emphasis added 1995, 122) 
 
 Care ethics involve primarily relational values of attentiveness, responsibility, 
competence, and responsiveness to the needs for care—qualities that are not restricted by 
any social category, be it gender, race, or class (Tronto 1993b, 252). These practices are 
not only present through the predominant theoretical examples of parent/child care, 
elderly care, or care of the sick and ill; the ethics of care can be practiced among adults 
who have no legal impairments (such as limited legal/political rights of those under 18 
years old) or physical or mental impairments (such as the elderly and disabled). Care in 
this sense should not be equated with respect of others’ rights, although it is certainly a 
component, but an ethic that requires involvement in the personal and social context. In 
contrast to respect for rights, care ethics promotes mutual trust and empathy. Through the 
mutual practices of care—both giving and receiving, which every person experiences—
we develop our ideas of how we want to live and who we want to be, a critical 
component of autonomy formation. Held’s conception of “mutual autonomy,” which fits 
under the relational autonomy umbrella, explains that “good caring relations can involve 
not only mutual recognition of moral equality but practices that avoid subtle as well as 
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blatant coercion where it is disrespectful and inconsiderate . . . we can foster trust and 
mutuality in place of benevolent domination” (56).  
 Held devotes an entire chapter to critiquing the emergence of market-driven 
values into every area of our lives, a topic relevant to my analysis of Oryx and Crake. 
She connects market values with liberal values of individual rights, autonomy and 
independence, and the primacy of the contract. In health care, education, 
environmentalism, child care, and other areas of life in which care is an explicit issue, 
any value system which privileges individualism over relation or universality over 
context is inappropriate because it devalues the ethic of care and its values of 
attentiveness, responsibility, responsiveness, and competence in the relational context. 
Held believes that if we draw boundaries around particular issues, such as these, then we 
will be able to allow the development of moral values outside of market values—where 
individual preference, primacy of the contract, and profit motives govern all activity. This 
would entail a radical restructuring of our society, our politics, and our market. 
In some of the most recent work on care ethics, some scholars are speculating that 
care and markets can be reconciled without such a radical approach. In a geographical 
study of a housing market in the U.K., Susan Smith, a political geographer, examines 
how people actually engage with markets, noting that they do not always do so within 
liberal values of independence and autonomy in their minds, but with concern for others 
and with the values of care. Smith asserts that “markets are made, and in all kinds of 
ways, not many of which resemble the economism by which they are so often indexed” 
(8). Markets do not exist in a vacuum; they are made socially, politically, and culturally. 
With this knowledge in hand, Smith claims that not only “the practice of politics but also 
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the performance of markets could, in theory, be made, required and expected to adopt 
vocabularies, motivations and inclinations that are positive rather than negative to 
welfare; that could prioritize (or not) concern for others. Markets do not have to be 
exempt from an ethic of care” (15).  
 Issues of care and the needs of the vulnerable form a particular problem for liberal 
theory, which is framed by a model of contracts between disinterested strangers who 
could care less about what reasons the other has for his or her actions. For liberal theory, 
the relationships between family and friends—people who care for each other—are 
unsuited for the development of moral theory because  
adult individuals . . . don’t want to be seen for moral purposes as 
enmeshed in relationships they did not choose . . . [persons] recognize 
obligations to respect others’ rights. But caring is something seen as 
limited to particular relations of family, lovers, or friends and as largely 
irrelevant to political institutions or even to moral theory. (Held 76-7)  
 
Within liberal theories, individuals are separate, autonomous agents who are free of 
obligations unless they enter into them voluntarily. A social and political care ethic is 
devalued directly because of the conception of the liberal subject; there are no moral 
obligations to care unless they are voluntarily entered into. Individual autonomy dictates 
that in the moral sense, no other person, their needs, or their relational claims upon you 
can dictate your choices in life, which are to be decided after rational consideration with 
emotion put to the side.  
Held writes, “It is not satisfactory to think of care, as it is conceptualized by 
liberal individualism, as a mere personal preference an individual may choose or not. 
Neither is it satisfactory to think of caring relationships as merely what rational 
individuals may choose to care about as long as they give priority to universal, impartial, 
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moral principles” (95). Held argues for making care more relevant in our social lives, as 
well as learning how to care about others for whom we are not directly responsible—
including “the Other,” that we define ourselves against, “Others” for example, that live 
on the other side of the world, or “Others” who are not like us, such as the potential 
clone. Care ethics have great potential for entering into and widening the debate on 
cloning with relevant questions of care and how cloning interferes with, confuses, or 
effaces issues of care in familial, societal, and global contexts.    
A final issue that care scholars address in liberal theory is the presumption of care 
that underwrites the entire rights framework. While liberal theories tend to claim that 
individual rights can only be restricted on the basis of harm to society, care ethics raises 
our attention to the realm of civic association that takes place in between the individual 
and the larger society. In civic associations,  
members develop enough empathetic feeling for one another to engage in 
common projects . . . [they] often think as much about maintaining the 
association and the connectedness it involves as about the individual gains 
or losses to them resulting from their membership. There exists in this 
realm of public life a presumption of social relations that hold individuals 
together, and without them, the larger society will not cohere. (Held 131-
2)  
 
Empathy is a civic virtue that maintains community relationships. Liberal theory 
presumes that this civic life exists, as well as caring relationships between families in the 
private sphere. 
 These civic associations are extremely important according to Ruth Groenhout, a 
feminist scholar whose work, Connected Lives: Human Nature and an Ethics of Care 
(2004), includes a chapter on care and cloning. Groenhout claims that liberal conceptions 
of rights and justice obscure or dismiss the social production of identity. This social 
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production of identity takes place in the middle ground between the individual and the 
larger society—the civil society. Ultimately promoting a new form of eugenics, cloning 
technology will not be a social good, Groenhout argues, but rather will create a new 
category for discrimination. Groenhout rejects the possibility of human cloning on the 
basis that “we need to learn what it is to be human by accepting human differences and 
finitudes rather than assuming that the best way to think about human nature is as 
something we can modify with impunity” (183).  
The Politics of Cloning and the Concerns of Care 
 
When we examine current debates about cloning, it is apparent that liberal justice theory 
provides the framework from which to discuss whether it should be allowed, who should 
fund it, or how it could be regulated. In this section, I will discuss some of the main 
arguments in favor of cloning research and speculate how care ethics approach might 
respond to these arguments.  
One of the primary arguments in favor of allowing human cloning is reproductive 
freedom, “properly understood to include . . . a negative right, that is, a right to use 
[assisted reproductive technologies] without interference by the government or others 
when made available by a willing provider” (Brock 143). This right is based on the 
liberal assumption that autonomy is fostered by the right not to be interfered with by 
others, in particular, society or the government. Reproductive rights to cloning are also 
tied to open markets for care, which are problematic for care ethics scholars like Held. 
The right to reproduce, according to many liberal critics, includes the right to choose 
what kind of child to have, relevant to the cloning debate and debates over “designer 
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babies,” genetically enhanced children whose parents could choose particular genetic 
attributes to be manipulated or inserted at the embryonic stage. This right is also argued 
within the context that parents maintain a substantial amount of control over who their 
children will become outside of genetic considerations through educational choices and 
parenting practices; therefore, genetic factors should also be considered as entrenched 
within parental rights rather than subject to state restrictions. John Harris claims that the 
right to reproductive freedom also includes the right to genetically manipulate a potential 
child for desirable characteristics (79). With a strict interpretive framework of 
constitutional law, the right to reproductive freedom must arguably allow the freedom of 
choice to produce particular children through germline manipulation.  
In Oryx and Crake, this technology is just starting to be widely practiced by 
prospective parents, who have lost the ability to appreciate children for who they are in 
favor of molding them into a particular type of person who will easily conform to a 
narrow conception of what is considered “successful” in society. A care ethics approach 
would consider carefully the practices of parenting that form the context for cloning and 
genetic manipulation. Today, there is an increasing trend towards intensive parenting, 
documented in the practice of motherhood by Sharon Hays. While Hays’ book, The 
Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood (1998), concentrates on the evolution of the 
practices of mothering, we can apply its main point towards parenting in general. 
Intensive parenting practices result in a highly controlling and potentially coercive 
relationship between parents and children. Accompanied by the increasing tendency for 
medical practices to intervene in the well-being of children, as defined by socially 
constructed norms of successful personhood, intensive parenting ideologies combined 
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with cloning and/or genetic manipulation of children before they are born may be 
detrimental to individuals as well as family relationships.  
The relationships between children and parents are sometimes articulated as a 
conflict between parents’ rights to reproductive freedom and a child’s right to an open 
future. In a speculative U.S. Supreme Court opinion about the constitutionality of cloning 
under reproductive rights, Cass Sunstein argues that there may be a constitutional right to 
reproductive cloning, “akin to the rights to use contraception and to have an abortion, 
firmly recognized under our prior causes” that can be invaded only “if the government 
can satisfy ‘strict scrutiny’, by showing the most compelling of justifications” (208). On 
one side, a federal government cloning ban “could not survive rational basis review” in 
the courts. On the other, the government might have a rational basis for the ban based on 
the prevention of social harm (213). Arguments against human cloning that parallel 
reproductive freedom invoke the “right to have a unique identity and a right to ignorance 
about one’s future or to an open future” (Brock 151). These rights of a would-be child 
conflict with the rights of would-be parents, and have provoked an ethical debate 
concerning whether we have a duty to consider the rights of future persons at all.  
 How would a care approach address the right to cloning under the right to 
reproductive freedom? Parents may harbor expectations of a clone or a genetically 
enhanced child that are unrealistic because social and environmental factors of a child’s 
development would be discounted. This would function as an oppressive form of 
relational autonomy in which parents would, perhaps unconsciously, apply affection and 
love upon a child only if they turned out the way they were genetically “ordered.” A 
common objection to the right to reproductive freedom, as articulated above, is the 
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contrasting right to an open future, which would be in doubt if a clone of another person 
were produced. A common argument against this assertion is that clones frequently occur 
in nature. Identical twins could be said to be clones, and there does not appear to be any 
psychological or identity issues particular to twins that would be exacerbated or amplified 
in a clone; however, this analogy does not reflect the intention present in the creation of a 
clone that is not present in the creation of identical twins.  Additionally, Groenhout 
asserts that it is ridiculous to ignore the genetic determinism that is advanced by scientific 
rhetoric and its effect on potential parents. A care ethics approach draws attention to the 
relationship between those who need care, such as children, and those who provide care, 
such as parents. The parent child relationship is not a relationship of equality, and the 
argument that a child has a right to an open future may be discounted because children 
are not extended the same rights as full adults in our society. Therefore, the conflict of 
rights claim is problematic. As explained above, care ethics, as a contextual approach to 
ethical problems, would consider the cultural contexts of the right to reproductive 
freedom. Groenhout speculates that “it is hard to see why parents would choose to 
produce a child through the complicated, expensive, and risky technique of cloning if 
they did not think that the cloned individual would be, in some sense, the individual 
cloned” (172).  
The genetic determinism assumption is supported by the study of “behavioral 
genetics,” which implies that human traits including intelligence, sexuality, criminality, 
mental illness, and even caring behaviors have genetic links that may be manipulated 
(U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science). It is fairly clear that proponents of 
genetic manipulation of embryos for particular genes that express certain traits, would 
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have the motivation of creating a particular type of person whose autonomy would be 
limited by the expectations of those with whom they have close relationships, such as 
their parents. This could be demonstrably true in a social sense, if not a biological one. 
With a clone, a parent might know what to expect beforehand, taking some of the anxiety 
out of parenthood. Known quantities always seem safer and simpler than unknown ones. 
This also draws attention to the fact that parenthood is often seen as a one-sided 
responsibility and right; by contrast, a care approach to parenthood recognizes the 
reciprocal quality of the parent/child relationship. Few parents, I think, would disagree 
that children teach parents about life just as much as parents teach children. Removing 
the uncertainty factor in a child would diminish our capacity to learn from our children, 
as well as the joy and surprise we often find in them. Because the care ethic approach to 
autonomy is at its core a relational condition, we must pay attention to the values and 
motivations expressed in a desire to produce a clone and the potential relationships that 
may be affected as a result. Under a care ethics approach, the constitutional right to 
reproduction would not include the right to clone.   
 Another major argument for the advancement of cloning technology is the appeal 
to freedom of scientific research, linked explicitly to freedom of thought and freedom of 
speech. This right is contested mainly by pointing out that cloning is not safe, transferring 
the onerous of proof onto the scientific community. At this point, we should be reminded 
of the earlier quotation from Craig Venter, a leader in the scientific community, who 
claimed that ethics does not come before experimentation. Still, most scientists agree that 
cloning is not safe and should not be pursued to produce a new person. Regardless, there 
is no law prohibiting it in the U.S. Another question we might ask is how science will 
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determine when it is safe to attempt a human clone. This question has yet to be addressed 
by anyone, either in science, bioethics, care ethics, or civic society.  
 One of the difficulties in answering this question lies in the fact that because 
federal funding is not approved for research on cloning, the majority of research takes 
place in private laboratories. The public has no say in what a company does beyond their 
willingness or refusal to buy market shares. A care approach to scientific freedom would 
be to simply limit the incursion of the market into areas of life such as reproduction. 
Also, science as a practice could be made more transparent to the public, bringing public 
concerns to the realm of civic discourse. Removing the market from reproduction would 
effectively change the current negative right to reproductive freedom into a positive 
right—the state would have to intervene as a provider of reproductive options, but we 
could demand that it do so with caring policies that are still fair and just. Within a care 
framework, constitutional rights to equal access could be invoked to avoid discriminatory 
application of reproductive services.  
State intervention would have to also include removing market involvement in 
currently used reproductive technologies such as IVF, which are well documented to be 
poorly regulated, highly selective in who they choose to help, and prone to low success 
rates (Weil 2006). In addition to restricting market involvement in reproductive 
technology, the issue of infertility should be treated not as a medical problem, but a social 
one that places a high value on the condition of motherhood to the detriment of women. 
Jean Bethke Elshtain writes that many women put themselves through the reproductive 
IVF wringer in order to have a genetically related child, which causes misery that “comes 
from having expectations lifted out of all proportion in relation to chances of success 
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(with procedures like in vitro), only to find, time and time again, that the miracle of 
modern medicine has turned into an invasive, expensive, mind-bending, heart-rending 
dud. A doleful denouement to high-tech generated expectations and the playing out of 
‘reproductive freedom’” (187). While not a care scholar, Elshtain’s remarks hit upon two 
important features of care ethics—attention to the care of the self, and to being aware of 
how our social world creates and encourages particular forms of behavior that may 
enhance or detract from autonomous choices.  
 The commodification of biotechnology includes such issues as the patenting of 
genes, cures to diseases discovered through genetic research, the future prospect of what 
Lee Silver calls the “Genrich,”7  and the body-parts industry; these issues fuel criticism 
by social justice advocates who see only greater inequality resulting from human genet
technology. Yet these same advocates find ways to argue within the justice framework, 
suggesting that perhaps social disadvantage could be bred away by using genetic 
technology to deliberately enhance the characteristics of certain historically 
disadvantaged groups.8   A care ethics approach asserts “we need to think through 
whether ‘genetic improvement’ can ever be separated from the illegitimate assumption 
that some human lives are worth less than others” (Groenhout 181). If we kept market 
values out of reproduction, then we would have an opportunity to examine more closely 
the social implications of genetic intervention and cloning.  
ic 
                                                
 Richard Epstein, a libertarian legal scholar, states that “the major social task is to 
divide legal action from illegal conduct” in the context of harms to society (265). 
 
7 the upper economic classes who are the only ones who can afford access to genetic technology, See 
Silver (1997). 
8 For an excellent primer on genetic equality arguments, see Farrelly (2004). 
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Relevant harms to cloning may include psychological harms to the cloned child; 
however, Epstein dismisses these easily with the “twin” argument. Another might be 
psychological harm to the parent, which Epstein believes can be fixed by making it clear, 
“by statute and by agreement, if not by birth, that the woman who gives birth to a cloned 
child must agree to raise it as her own, for better or for worse. We can demand that her 
husband take on the obligations of its father. For single women, we might be forced to do 
without a father” (274). Epstein does not support a ban on human cloning because “few 
would be inconvenienced” (276). Epstein is comfortable with legally burdening women 
more than men, as he does not include what legal obligations a single father of a clone 
would have. It must be unthinkable that a cloned child would have to do without a 
mother. Epstein’s argument demonstrates the liberal approach to care. Care takes place in 
the private home, and how a clone would be cared for by a parent or set of parents that do 
not truly want it (i.e., if it does not meet their genetic expectations) is not a consideration 
for the law, presumably unless the child is abused. A care approach would address these 
motivations in advance, and work out ways in which society and political policy could 
contribute to an appropriate and caring environment for optimal development of all 
children, whether they are produced “naturally” or through reproductive technologies.  
 In conclusion to his analysis of the legalities of cloning, Epstein argues that “if it 
should come to pass that some horror stories occur, then we can think of more focused 
responses, just as we do in many other areas of life” (Epstein 277). His argument 
demonstrates the reactive character of liberal conceptions of the role of law and policy in 
society and should serve as a warning flag that the political system in place will wait for 
those horror stories first, before they attempt to legislate against them. Never Let Me Go 
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demonstrates the difficulty in relying on legislation against Epstein’s “horror stories after 
the fact”; Ishiguro’s clones provide a benefit for humanity that is not easily reversed by 
appeals to justice. Because clones are denied human rights, they have no legal standing 
either; they are embedded in relationships of power that are unrecognized either by 
themselves or their “guardians,” setting legal solutions outside the realms of possibility.   
 The care approach to legal issues is, as always, a contextual one; however, it does 
advocate that there are particular areas of life that are subject to claims of justice, while 
others are subject to claims of care. I have presented care ethics as opposed to cloning for 
a variety of reasons, all of which are related to the concept of persons as socially 
embedded, relational in their autonomy, and resistant of the reach of the market in 
reproductive choices. Epstein’s suggestion that statute and agreement be forced upon a 
woman who gives birth to a cloned child is an example of an extremely uncaring 
application of justice and illustration of the reactive nature of liberal procedures. 
Epstein’s arguments for not banning cloning are uncaring in the same manner that 
Venter’s claim about science and ethics is uncaring. Care ethics would advocate for a 
wide ranging, inclusive, and public debate over how to ensure attentiveness to potential 
harms, responsiveness to those harms in a proactive way, responsibility to see that harm 
is avoided, and competence to ensure the avoidance of situations that would make care a 
complicated and difficult process. 
A commonly used argument against cloning is that it would be a violation of the 
principle of human dignity. What exactly is human dignity? According to the U.N. 
Declaration on Human Rights, human dignity is an inherent quality of human persons 
that entitles them to certain rights and standards of living (United Nations). In order for 
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cloning to be a violation of human dignity, then, clones would have to be widely 
considered as non-human, an issue explored by Ishiguro in Never Let Me Go through the 
clone rights movement. The Catholic Church is the strongest proponent of the human 
dignity argument, although they also assert that clones would be human, and “extend to 
persons created through cloning the same moral protections that already apply to other 
persons created in the image of God” (National Bioethics Advisory Commission 170). 
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission argues that “concerns about identity and 
individuality focus mainly on how persons created through cloning will inevitably or 
possibly be treated, rather than whether such persons are actually unique creatures in 
God’s image” (170). The crux of the human dignity argument is not actually whether 
clones would be human—they clearly would be—but is based on the historically-
supported presumption that society will not treat them so, no matter what rights are set in 
place to protect them.  
In Never Let Me Go, clones, who do not have parents or genetic ties to any others, 
are exclusively genetically determined. As products of humans rather than nature, they 
are assumed to be lacking souls and are treated as animals. The creation of clones outside 
of the institution of the family supports denying them human rights and human dignity. 
Cloning as an explicit power issue has not been explored yet by any theorist. If the debate 
over cloning continues to be framed by rights and justice, then it appears to be simply a 
matter of passing laws that guarantee clones human rights. The global struggle for human 
rights demonstrates how passing a resolution or a law that applies to everyone in theory 
does not necessarily work in practice. By contrast, a care ethics approach is firmly rooted 
in human dignity; the values and practices of care acknowledges and advances human 
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dignity. The inherent dignity of persons can be affirmed by justice and a platform for 
human rights, but it does not begin there. It begins with an appropriate social and political 
conception of care as the foundation for human flourishing. Care must be valued and 
supported if human rights are to have any effect on human life.  
 Political arguments about human cloning are almost universally based on liberties 
and rights that can obscure issues of care. Care theorists have been careful to demonstrate 
how many of the personal freedoms we take for granted grow out of a presumption of 
personal and social formulations of care. Only by paying attention to the personal and 
social needs for care can we hope to promote a more equally just society through law and 
policy. Cloning would not necessarily ease the needs for care; it would likely exacerbate 
these needs, both for clones as well as for the people that produce them and live with 
them. In the second chapter of this thesis, I demonstrate that speculative fiction can help 
to provide a concrete context from which to analyze how caring relationships cannot be 
presumed when we are looking at the social implications of cloning technology, as liberal 
theory presumes they exist. Cloning is envisioned by scientists in these novels as a cure 
for the needs for care, with disastrous consequences for individuals and larger society.    
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 Chapter 2: Speculative Visions of Cloning Technology 
 
The novel is a literary mode that embeds characters in particular social situations and as 
such, may serve as a context for examining ethical issues. This point is elaborated by 
Peter Johnson, when he states that moral philosophers use literature in three ways. First, 
novels are deployed in moral philosophy as sources for examples. Second, characters, 
plots, or narrative events are “used as a way of illustrating the weakness in the ethical 
theory that purports to explain them,” (13) as well as, in the case of the works of 
speculative fiction examined here, to point out the strengths of an ethical theory whose 
tenets are devalued in the society depicted in the narrative. Third, the novel can perform a 
persuasive role in an ethics “completely disestablished from its traditional foundational 
role” (13). Martha Nussbaum, in her interdisciplinary exploration of ethics and literature, 
finds that literature provides “a certain type of priority to the perception of particular 
people and situations, rather than to abstract rules . . .this conception, rather than being 
imprecise and irrational, is actually superior in rationality and in the relevant sort of 
precision” (vi). Literature provides a concrete context for ethics. This approach is 
particularly appealing for feminist moral theory, which functions to show the inadequacy 
of the historically valued model: “the representation of morality as a compact, 
propositionally codifiable, impersonally action-guiding code within an agent, or as a 
compact set of law-like propositions that ‘explain’ the moral behavior of a well-formed 
moral agent” (Walker 7-8). Moral philosophy and literature, working hand in hand, seem 
to be a particularly useful place for a feminist inquiry into the ethics of care.  
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For example, Tronto notes how historically, utopian fictions have served as 
criticisms of current social habits more than in their vision of what is possible (1999, 
158). She also observes how “some of the most compelling visions of polities of care are 
utopian” (1993b, 251), pointing specifically to Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland and 
Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time. Like Tronto’s observation that utopian 
narratives provide compelling visions of the political uses of the ethic of care, 
speculative, dystopian narratives also provide interesting insights into care, primarily its 
glaring absence or its misuse.  
 The speculative novels I consider here follow the characteristics of dystopian 
literature. Dystopian fiction is less an established genre than a “particular kind of 
oppositional and critical energy or spirit” (Booker 3). While dystopian literature “situates 
itself in direct opposition to utopian thought . . . [it also] constitutes a critique of existing 
social conditions or political systems, either through the critical examination of the 
utopian premises upon which those conditions and systems are based or through the 
imaginative extension of those conditions and systems into different contexts that more 
clearly reveal their flaws or contradictions” (Booker 3). In short, the picture of the society 
that develops within the narrative must be recognizable to our own, in contrast to 
completely made-up worlds of hard science fiction or fantasy novels. This interpretation 
is supported by Margaret Atwood, who describes the difference between science fiction 
proper, which “denotes books with things in them we can’t yet do or begin to do, talking 
beings we can never meet, and places we can’t go—and speculative fiction, which 
employs the means already more or less to hand, and takes place on Planet Earth” (2004, 
513).  
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Neither of the novels directly opposes the development of biotechnologies such as 
cloning. Instead, they aim their critique at the society in which we now live, a moment 
when we have a chance to stop and consider how we will use technology and the role it 
will have in shaping how to live well in the future. In this analysis, I intend to show that 
traditional liberal conceptions are inadequate for developing a full understanding of the 
potential individual and social disruption and conflict that may result from an unregulated 
biotech industry.9  Political and social discussions of cloning must take place in public 
forums, and without the dismissal of concerns that encompass emotional and caring 
questions. In these novels, public discourse regarding the uses of human cloning and 
other related human biotechnologies is a major missing component of the societies in 
which these developments take place. My analysis demonstrates a concrete application 
for care ethics and shows how care ethics, an alternative framework to the dominant 
liberal conception, can function as a social, political, and global theory with critical 
applications for the future. 
The major themes and issues presented in these two novels offer up critiques of 
contemporary liberal ethics that can be addressed by analysis through a care ethics 
framework. Issues of care are present in the novels; however, they are not the main focus 
of either of them; instead, care issues are embedded, demonstrating how difficult it can be 
to recognize problems of care.  Many of my criticisms will deal directly with the absence 
of a care perspective in the societies and communities depicted in the novels. I extract 
from character development and narrative how a care approach would change the 
                                                 
9 Critics claim that the industry will likely not be heavily regulated, but left to consumer choice.  See Hilden 
(2002).  
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ultimate outcome of each novel. The main components of care ethics forms the basis for 
my critique, which includes: a conception of persons as social and relational as opposed 
to autonomous and self-interested; the need for a contextual approach to problems rather 
than universal rules that are assumed to promote a just and fair society; the power issues 
that arise in relationships, which deeply affect care provision and autonomous agency; 
and finally, the need for some form of civil society where regular citizens can articulate 
concerns of care and promote the values of care in the absence of political or 
governmental provisions for care. 
I examine each novel’s depiction of the society from which cloning emerges and 
show how the values of care and the practices of care are directly correlative to 
developments in cloning technology. In each case, cloning emerges in a society that lacks 
appropriate individual/familial or social care ethics, or the social care ethic that does exist 
functions within oppressive and perverse conditions. The missing value of care in the 
social realm affects each character in different ways, but always with a negative result. 
Lack of caring values is manifested in the relationships of characters, both in the public 
and private realms. In Oryx and Crake, cloning technology develops to correct this lack 
of care for future generations. Lack of care—both its values and its practices—is 
demonstrated as a causal factor of the downfall of the human, and care becomes an 
important characteristic of the engineered posthuman future. Atwood’s posthumans, as 
imagined and genetically engineered by Crake, are particularly caring and communal. For 
Ishiguro, cloning is used subversively to provide organs for a donation program that is 
inherently unjust and oppressive for donors; care ethics are forced on a segment of the 
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population who are denied even basic human rights because it is easier to choose not to 
see them as human than to give up scientific advancements in medicine.  
 Oryx and Crake and Never Let Me Go are framed by narrators who are looking 
back, retrospectively, in an attempt to figure out how they came to be in a particular 
situation in time; the telling of life narratives allows us to look back in order to see points 
in time in which the narrative could have gone in a different direction. They each present 
a social history of sorts, with references to “before” (before cloning became a reality). 
Both Oryx and Crake and Never Let Me Go have particular points in the narrative in 
which a main character could have made a different choice—could have resisted—and 
changed the trajectory of the story. The novels critique the world of science without 
ethics, and place the arts and humanities as critical discourses for individual, social, and 
political change, but only when they are applied, as Cathy Davidson and David Theo 
Goldberg describe, normatively and prescriptively—suitable to critique social 
organization with full appreciation for the magnitude and implications of change 
necessary to create a caring and just world (Davidson and Goldberg 2004). In the 
introduction to this thesis, I claimed that the larger challenge of care ethics scholars is to 
discover ways of making care issues more visible and valued by our social and political 
institutions. I suggest, as do these novels, that the arts and humanities could help to draw 
attention to care issues, bringing them out into the open for civic discussion and 
promoting the values of care—attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and 
responsiveness—in order to demand a social and political care ethic in addition to, and in 
support of, private care efforts.  
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Oryx and Crake10 
 
In this analysis of Oryx and Crake, I will show how injustices are brought about by 
misplaced values. Market values and particular liberal values including reproductive 
freedom, scientific freedom, and individual choice are accompanied by a dismissal of the 
values of care and inattention to the needs for care. This absence of care is represented in 
the characters’ personal development and in their relationships with each other. While 
care ethics has developed as a theory from the private to the public, Oryx and Crake 
demonstrates the need for reciprocal realms of care. A theoretical reversal is now needed, 
one of social and governmental valuation of care that promotes appropriate care in the 
family. Social or governmental attention to the needs for care in the family could have 
resulted in an avoidance of a global catastrophe in Atwood’s novel; but the social, 
political, and economic system that shapes the characters’ lives prevents any critical 
reflection on how they might change their world into a more caring one. Oryx and Crake 
is a retrospective narrative told by “Snowman,” who is presumed to be the last living 
human on earth, attempting to avoid starvation and disease in a now hostile earth 
environment. Left in his care are the Crakers, a bioengineered race of posthumans, 
created in the lab by Crake, the scientist of the novel and Snowman’s former best friend, 
who is now dead.  The Crakers are a communal race that exhibit caring behaviors 
towards each other and to the “Other,” in direct contrast to the liberal, individualist, and 
                                                 
10 Literary criticism on Oryx and Crake is limited; I do not use any of the literary criticism on Oryx and 
Crake as much of it is not directly related to my topic.  Selected criticism for review might include: 
Grayson Cooke’s article (2006) on the underlying myths and the scientific hubris of the novel; Stephen 
Dunning’s article (2005) that stresses the dangers of worshiping modern science over art and humanistic 
pursuits; Toby Widdicombe’s essay (2006) on several of Atwood’s books that imagine the future; Danette 
DiMarco’s article (2005) that highlights human instrumentalism in Oryx and Crake; and Coral Ann Howells’ 
essay (2006) on Oryx and Crake as a survivor narrative. 
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market-driven characteristics of humanity before the global catastrophe that nearly wipes 
them out. As “Snowman” contemplates what he must do to survive, he reflects on his life 
as “Jimmy,” and the course of events that led him to his stranded situation.  
Jimmy grows up in a corporate biotechnology compound, where his father and 
mother both work to develop technical cures for human problems. His mother eventually 
quits her job for ethical reasons, and after an extended depression, flees the compounds in 
secret to join an underground radical group that uses violence to protest the oppressive 
economic values of science. Jimmy befriends Crake, a lonely and isolated teenage genius, 
who comes to believe that humanity on earth has outlived its usefulness. He uses the 
economized values of science to engineer a worldwide plague, accompanied by 
humanity’s replacement race, the Crakers, which he developed in the lab with caring 
values and species survival biologically predetermined. Following this engineered 
destruction of humanity, only Jimmy, immune to the virus, is left to care for the Crakers 
so they can survive in the earth’s damaged environment. Snowman muses, “Despite their 
irritating qualities . . . he feels protective towards them. Intentionally or not, they’ve been 
left in his care, and they simply have no idea. No idea, for instance, of how inadequate 
his care really is” (Atwood 153).  
The society that shapes the events in Atwood’s novel is one in which care values 
(attentiveness, responsibility, responsiveness, and competence) are subordinated to those 
of the market (property rights, choice, entrepreneurism, spectacle) with deep implications 
for how people live and how children develop. Relational aspects of life are de-
emphasized, while the values of freedom, liberty, profit, and efficiency are widely shared 
and promoted by corporate biotechnology research and development compounds. Crake 
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develops in accord with the values of the community in which he lives. He views himself 
and the rest of humankind in opposition to “nature” and shapes his life so that he can be 
in control of nature. In contrast, Jimmy possesses a sense of relational interdependence 
and caring values, but because of the market value driven society he lives in, is not able 
to practice those caring values with other people. He is only able to develop and practice 
it with nature; he is affectionate and relational with animals and later, with the Crakers. 
Jimmy’s mother, Sharon, is ultimately the foil to Crake, representative of the modern 
“mad scientist,” who conducts work in isolation that will have a profound effect on 
humanity, free of the social critique that may limit scientific freedom. The only method 
of social critique of biotechnology available is through radical, underground, and violent 
activist groups. In addition to obscuring the values of care, the supremacy of the market 
also prevents democratic values from flourishing. Because of the social world Sharon 
lives in, she is unable to affect any real change, even through this radical brand of 
collective political action. Oryx and Crake is fundamentally about the relational 
interdependence of all living things on earth, a critical component of a care ethics 
approach, and the novel serves as a warning that if we should fail to recognize our 
interdependence—not only human interdependence—disastrous consequences will 
follow.  
Oryx and Crake is set in the near future, but recalls our present time as a 
conception of the good life, before advancements in commercial applications for 
biotechnology became the driving force that guided all areas of life. This conception of 
the good life involves the civic society, the area in between the individual and the 
government, where citizens engage in common projects for social good. As “Snowman” 
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reflects on his life as “Jimmy,” he describes the OrganInc compounds where he and his 
parents lived. He says that “inside, [things] were the way it used to be when Jimmy’s 
father was a kid, before things got so serious . . . Jimmy’s mother said it was all artificial, 
it was just a theme park and you could never bring the old ways back, . . . but you could 
walk around without fear, couldn’t you? Go for a bike ride, sit at a sidewalk café, buy and 
ice-cream cone? Jimmy knew his father was right, because he himself had done all these 
things” (27). Despite the appearance of a “good life” in the compounds, “everyone’s 
parents moaned on about stuff like . . . remember when you could drive anywhere? 
Remember when everyone lived in the pleeblands? Remember when you could fly 
anywhere in the world, without fear? Remember hamburger chains, always real beef, 
remember hot-dog stands? Remember before New York was New New York? Remember 
when voting mattered?” (italics in original, 63). In their nostalgic recollection of what 
society used to be like, Jimmy’s parents articulate a conception of the good life, which 
the compounds unsuccessfully attempt to recreate. This conception includes the values 
associated with shared action in a relational context—“everyone lived in the pleeblands” 
and “voting mattered.”  The inclusion of voting accentuates the quality of this previous 
age, when politics was something that had an effect on people’s lives. Prior to the “end of 
humanity,” democratic politics has no role; the market is completely unfettered. 
Society is represented as dangerous, indicating that the liberal ideal of limited 
government is taken to an extreme. The contemporary public realm of Oryx and Crake is 
described as an unsafe and risky environment, with fingerprint identity cards, leaky 
public security, people cruising around who could forge anything and might be anybody, 
“not to mention the loose change—the addicts, the muggers, the paupers, the crazies” of 
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American cities—the “pleeblands” (27). The corporate compounds are where the 
privileged live and work completely separate from others in society. For those in the 
compounds, almost exclusively scientists, the pleeblands are nothing more than 
experimental labs for biotech products. For compound dwellers, “nothing of interest went 
on in the pleeblands, apart from buying and selling . . . plus a lot of criminal activity” 
(196). They exist only for economic exploitation. There is no sense of shared community; 
the ties that might bind a nation or a state together are absent—there is only a distinction 
between the compounds and the pleeblands. Relational values are effaced in the values 
that govern the compounds.  
The governmental role in the economy is also absent in Atwood’s novel, 
exemplifying the neoliberal ideal of free markets. There is no government oversight of 
the compounds to ensure that research takes place within boundaries that secure social 
good; each corporation, ruled by market considerations alone, is completely isolated 
within its own walls. We might say that they represent on a large scale, the liberal, 
autonomous subject. As a result, technology in Oryx and Crake is developed for profit 
rather than for the good of humankind. Biotechnology firms are privatized, and follow 
the neoliberal “assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the 
market and of trade” (Harvey 7). Products developed in the compounds are marketed on 
the liberal assertion that people’s motivations within the market are purely individualist 
rather than caring and relational. The purpose of “pigoons,” which are pigs hybridized to 
grow human organs for transplant, means that replacement parts are cheaper than “getting 
yourself cloned for spare parts” or “keeping a for-harvest child or two stashed away in 
some illegal baby orchard” (23). In advertising “NooSkins for Olds,” technology for 
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growing skin cells is marketed to “well-to-do and once-young, once-beautiful” women or 
men who would “sell their house, their gated retirement villa, their kids, and their soul” to 
maintain a youthful appearance (55). Little consideration is given to NooSkins being used 
in medicine for burn victims or skin grafting. Caring purposes for compound products are 
not developed because they are not as profitable.  
HelthWyzer, where Jimmy and Crake grow up, is a healthcare corporation, but 
their practices are not governed by concerns for care; HelthWyzer practices “the 
economics of scarcity, so they’re guaranteed high profits” (211). While curing diseases is 
their main goal, HelthWyzer recognizes the need for a continual customer base in order 
to stay in operation.  
“Listen, this is brilliant,” Crake tells Jimmy, “They put the hostile 
bioforms into their vitamin pills . . . they have a really elegant delivery 
system—they embed a virus inside a carrier bacterium, E. coli splice, 
doesn’t get digested, bursts in the pylorus, and bingo! . . . Naturally they 
develop the antidotes at the same time as they’re customizing the bugs . . . 
The best diseases, from a business point of view,” said Crake, “would be 
those that cause lingering illnesses. Ideally—that is, for maximum profit—
the patient should either get well or die just before all of his or her money 
runs out.” (211)  
 
The values of the market govern even healthcare corporations, demonstrating how 
idealized values of neoliberalism may actually be practiced in the future real world, if, as 
Susan Smith suggests, we fail to collectively demand from our politics a caring aspect of 
our markets.  
 One of the values being associated with biotechnology markets today is secrecy—
a form of protectionism of intellectual property rights. In Oryx and Crake, this value 
interferes with care values in the family, so that not even “special” relationships between 
individuals have primary importance. Crake’s father had collected evidence of the 
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vitamin conspiracy, and “was going to do some whistle-blowing through a rogue Web 
site—those things have wide viewership, it would have wrecked the pleebland sales of 
every single Helthwyzer vitamin supplement . . . it would have caused financial havoc. 
Think of the job losses. He wanted to warn them first” (212). Before Crake’s father could 
make the information public, he told his wife and his brother, either of whom may have 
been the one who reported the possibility of scandal to the compound police. Crake 
speculates on his father’s “execution,” in the form of assisted suicide, thinking “They’d 
have said he was about to destroy an elegant concept. They’d have said they were acting 
for the general good” (212). This “assisted suicide” of Crake’s father shows the 
breakdown of care in the nuclear family in the society of Oryx and Crake. His wife and 
brother are suspected of turning him into the CorpSeCorps, demonstrating that care is no 
longer possible within the private domain. Care ethics scholarship frequently points to the 
liberal presumption of care that takes place within special relationships of friends and 
family. In Oryx and Crake, the secrecy attached to market values dominates relationships 
among family members. The concerns for care within the family, the relationships that 
underwrite liberal assumptions of freedom and liberty, are obliterated by market values 
that function to run right over liberal freedoms. If secrecy can be replaced by 
transparency, then a space for public discourse about the way biotechnology is developed 
may reveal the need to remove the values of the market from areas that are most 
concerned with caring practices and values, as Held suggests. If biotechnology is 
developed in our society exclusively in private corporations, such as HelthWyzer in Oryx 
and Crake, our own society implicitly aligns with market values, such as secrecy, to the 
detriment of care. 
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The market’s interference with care also extends outside of family relations in the 
compounds, where care for citizens is subsumed under concern for the economic value of 
technology. The CorpSeCorps are the private police force of the compounds, trained to 
defend the technology that is developed in them, not the people that live and work there. 
Bio-theft and bio-piracy among competing corporations and scientists of other nations are 
rampant, “[o]ther companies, other countries, various factions and plotters. There was too 
much hardware around . . . too many hostile bioforms, too many weapons of every kind” 
(27-8). The CorpSeCorps have authority to kill anyone who might directly or indirectly 
interfere with research. Jimmy’s father tells of an “incident” shortly before they moved 
into the HelthWyzer compound, where a woman, “some fanatic . . . with a hostile 
bioform . . . nuked a guard who’d unwisely had his face mask off . . . The woman had 
been spraygunned at once and neutralized in a vat of bleach” (53). Later, Jimmy’s own 
mother becomes a target of the compound police force, even though she no longer lives 
within the compounds.   
The products of biotechnology are dangerous, and their development promotes 
oppressive practices rather than caring ones both inside and outside the walls of the 
compounds. Security patrolled the walls of the perimeter as well as the grounds. Jimmy’s 
father saw them as “for our own good,” to keep them safe (54); by contrast, his mother 
Sharon “felt like a prisoner” (53). Inside the compounds, people are discouraged from 
taking advantage of the biotechnological developments that are produced there, 
indicating the dangerous nature of various technologies in development. When Jimmy 
reports to work following a weekend in the pleeblands with Crake, he hopes that his 
bosses do not find out where he has been because “though it encouraged all kinds of 
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chemical experimentation by its paying clientele, AnooYoo frowned upon anything 
similar amongst the hired help” (290). Atwood occasionally describes the results of 
research and development in the compounds, such as Crake’s attempts to perfect the 
BlyssPluss pill:  
At the clinical trial stage . . . A couple of the test subjects had literally 
fucked themselves to death, several had assaulted old ladies and household 
pets, and there had been a few unfortunate cases of priapism and split 
dicks. Also, at first, the sexually transmitted disease protection mechanism 
had failed in a spectacular manner. One subject had grown a big genital 
wart all over her epidermis, distressing to observe. (295) 
 
The results were “distressing to observe,” but no care is extended to prevent or relieve the 
suffering of the test subjects, who come “from the poorer countries. Pay them a few 
dollars, they don’t even know what they’re taking” (296). The unmarketed, but known to 
investors, purpose of Crake’s BlyssPluss pill is to reduce the population of the world—
the population outside of the compounds—in order to make “fewer people, therefore 
more [resources] to go around” (295). This is a fully acceptable use of biotechnology for 
Crake’s investors, who were “very keen on it, it was going to be global. It was all upside. 
There was no downside at all” (294). Once again, the values of care are absent. The only 
considerations for investors and researchers involve possible profits. 
 Despite being born and raised in a society that places its highest values within 
those of the market, Jimmy’s early values are aligned with values of care. As Snowman 
reflects on his childhood as Jimmy, he recalls his earliest memory, a bonfire of animal 
carcasses (the result of some bioterrorism in the compounds) he watches with his parents. 
This early memory marks Jimmy’s potential as a caring person. At the bonfire, Jimmy is 
concerned “about the animals, because they were being burned and surely that would hurt 
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them . . . he thought he could see the animals looking at him reproachfully out of their 
burning eyes. In some way all of this . . . was his fault, because he’d done nothing to 
rescue them” (18). After the bonfire he had to walk through a pan of disinfectant. His 
boots were “red with a smiling duck’s face on each toe,” and he was “worried that the 
poison would get into the eyes of the ducks and hurt them” (15). In contrast to most 
people in the compounds, Jimmy felt an empathetic connection with other living things 
early in his life. He exhibits the potential to be a caring person, thinking of other lives 
with genuine concern and care. He also recognizes that other life is tied to his. When he 
visits the pigoons, hybrid pig/human animals bred for organ harvesting, his father warns 
him not to fall in the pen because the pigoons would eat him. Jimmy claims that they 
would not, because “I’m their friend . . . Because I sing to them” (26). Even after he 
grows up, Jimmy holds to these values in small ways. As he recalled watching videos of 
Alex the parrot, Jimmy thinks of how the bird would ask for a certain reward for 
answering a question correctly; instead, they gave him something else—something he did 
not ask for . . . “seeing this would bring tears to Jimmy’s eyes . . . If Alex the parrot were 
his, they’d be friends, they’d be brothers” (260-61). Jimmy’s memories show him to be a 
relational subject, but only with animals—other important people in his life, all 
“numbers” people, turned to science in order to control nature, rather than develop a 
relationship with it. This “controlling” aspect of life in the compounds extends far beyond 
social and environmental considerations. It extends all the way down to relationships 
with each other.  
 This attention to Jimmy’s caring qualities as a young man may be interpreted as a 
claim that care is an inherent value to humans. Michael Slote theorizes that care is a 
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virtue and a disposition rather than a value and a practice (Slote 2001). This is the 
difference between virtue ethics and care ethics. Jimmy is a caring and relational person, 
but is unable to develop his personal virtues into a care ethic, because his social 
environment discourages “the intention to care and the disposition to care effectively [and 
to actively participate] in caring relations” (Held 51). His recognition of the social self 
and his relational status does not result in a solid care ethic that involves action as well as 
reflection. A social ethic of care is necessary if we are to develop persons who act 
through an ethic of care, and this social care ethic is missing in every aspect of Jimmy’s 
life.  
 Jimmy’s parents fail to recognize and develop his talents for language or for 
caring attitudes towards other living things. How they live prevents them from 
developing their own care ethic with its accompanying values of attentiveness, 
responsibility, competence, and responsiveness. In keeping with the values of the 
compounds, Jimmy was encouraged to develop skills in science and math—become a 
“numbers person”—even though he naturally gravitated towards being a “word person.” 
Recalling his birthdays, he reflects his father’s belated gifts “that would not be a gift but 
some tool or intelligence-enhancing game or other hidden demand that he measure up . . . 
By OrganInc’s math-and-chem-and-applied-bio yardstick he must have seemed dull 
normal” (50). Jimmy’s relationship with his father was formal. They did not interact 
much with each other unless it involved his studies. In Jimmy’s own mind, he thought 
“they knew nothing about him, what he liked, what he hated, what he longed for. They 
thought he was only what they could see. A nice boy but a bit of a goof, a bit of a show-
off. Not the brightest star in the universe, not a numbers person” (58). His skills and 
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interests with language are a stark contrast to his difficulty with numbers, but this skill is 
not allowed to develop in a productive way. As a consequence, Jimmy learns to make 
jokes and to provoke people with his words.  
Caring relationships such as those between parents and children should exhibit the 
values of care; without them they may become coercive. Daniel Engster claims that 
“when individuals feel their particular needs and opinions are not being recognized . . . 
they experience humiliation and anger and often resort to covert or open acts of rebellion 
to demand recognition, or in other words, they counter unsociable treatment with more of 
the same” (Engster 130). Jimmy’s relationship with his depressed and emotionally absent 
mother is characterized by antagonism in an effort to get any kind of reaction: “He loved 
her so much when he made her unhappy, or else when she made him unhappy: at these 
moments he scarcely knew which was which . . . And he was sorry, but there was more to 
it: he was also gloating, congratulating himself, because he’d managed to create such an 
effect” (33). Later, his relationships with other women are characterized by the same 
kinds of games. He manipulates their emotions in order to get what he wants from them, 
never ending a relationship himself, but waiting until they were so frustrated by his 
“rainy day allure” and “emotional dyslexia” act, they dumped him (190). Jimmy’s lack of 
success in relationships are a result of the previous lack of attentiveness and 
responsiveness from the people who should be closest to him, his parents.  
The tension between the values of care and values of the market are manifest in 
their most extreme form in Sharon. She stops working when Jimmy first starts school 
because of ethical concerns about “interfering with the building blocks of life” (57). She 
criticizes her husband for celebrating a scientific discovery, accusing him of thinking up 
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“yet another way to rip off a bunch of desperate people . . . the whole organization is 
wrong, it’s a moral cesspool” (56). Chronically depressed with her life that implicitly 
supports the values of the compounds, Sharon leaves the compound in secrecy, 
eventually joining an underground political group that fights against the biotech industry 
with subversive and violent methods. Throughout the telling of his story, Snowman 
reflects on his mother and can only see that she abandoned him; he fails to recognize that 
she was simply unable to care for him or herself in the corporatized society they lived in. 
One of the things that attracts Jimmy to Oryx is her unwillingness to pity him because of 
his mother’s abandonment. “So Jimmy, your mother went somewhere else?” she tells 
him, “Too bad. Maybe she had some good reasons. You thought of that?” (italics in 
original, 191). Sharon had no outlet within the compounds for the lack of social caring, 
which greatly damaged her own ability to care for her son. 
Sharon’s story demonstrates the totalitarian social regime that the compounds 
enforce. The lack of democratic institutions in the society within the walls means that 
there are no outlets for dissent other than violent ones on the outside. For example, just 
after Jimmy graduates high school, the “Happicuppa” coffee wars began. The 
Happicuppa coffee beans, developed by a biotech compound, “could be grown on huge 
plantations and harvested with machines. This threw the small growers out of business 
and reduced both them and their labourers to starvation-level poverty. The resistance 
movement was global” (179). The Happicuppa coffee wars, called by Crake “history in 
the making,” are actually a recreation of past history—the “Boston Coffee Party” sprang 
up, dumping crates of Happicuppa coffee into Boston Harbor (180). As they watch news 
coverage on TV, Crake’s Uncle Pete remarks that it will not be long before the activists 
59 
 
 
give up, claiming that ““[e]verybody wants a cheaper cup of coffee—you can’t fight 
that”” (180). Jimmy catches a glimpse of his mother, one of the participants in the Coffee 
Wars, on the news, concrete evidence of her subversive political activities.    
Sevenhuijsen writes of the “relocation of politics” taking place in today’s global 
society, with “power seeping away from the political centre of parliamentary democracy” 
in Europe, which, she claims, may lead to power without accountability (180). In Oryx 
and Crake, political power has been relocated to the private corporation, shutting out the 
possibility for civic agency to produce social change. Collective action in Oryx and 
Crake becomes a route to resist the commodification of life and ways of life, although it 
is ultimately an ineffective one for the characters that engage with it. Resistance groups 
are relatively powerless, demonstrated by the fact that they must operate outside of the 
law and in secret. Groups are represented as crazy, motivated by religion (clearly not a 
legitimate stance according to the corporatized moral majority), and out of touch with the 
real concerns of people. These “real” concerns are represented by the idealization of the 
freedom of competition, ultimately found in things like cheap cups of coffee, or in 
advancing an individual’s own chances in the “sexual market” by purchasing a brand new 
skin. The values of the market are so pervasive that people who seek to live inside legal 
or political boundaries—like Jimmy—are both physically and mentally paralyzed by 
those boundaries.  
This “paralysis” in Jimmy is manifest in his inability to see a road to change, 
either his own life or the society he lives in. Jimmy becomes a representation of Baier’s 
“passive citizen” who refuses to acknowledge responsibility for how the social and 
political world is organized. He is almost always angry, but is never able to release his 
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frustration. To compensate, he looks for other people to blame, especially Crake, after the 
global disaster caused by the BlyssPlus pill: “Things happened, I had no idea, it was out 
of my control! What could I have done?” (45). He wonders, “If I had killed Crake earlier 
. . . would it have made any difference?” (276). As he witnesses the downfall of the 
human race on television, he writes an account of what happened as a historical record, 
writing, “it is my belief that none, with the exception of Crake, was cognizant of what 
that effect [of the BlyssPluss pill] would be” (347).  Occasionally, Jimmy recognizes his 
culpability in shaping his life and affecting the lives of others. He greatly regrets his 
mother’s leaving, thinking “why hadn’t he seen it all coming and headed it off?” (64). 
His tendency to blame others, then himself, for various circumstances, demonstrates this 
physical and cognitive paralysis that results from the inadequate care he receives as he is 
growing up.  
Baier’s description of passive citizenship includes the acceptance of past social 
and political relationships—our inherited schemes of cooperation—between people as 
irrelevant to our current social and political responsibilities. In Oryx and Crake, moral 
responsibility, if it exists anywhere, exists only within individuals. Most individuals in 
the compounds see their scientific work as performing social good and giving people 
what they want. The larger context is simply someone else’s responsibility. Baier claims 
that  
if we insist on clinging to the idea that moral responsibility must divide 
without remainder into the bit that is mine and not yours and the other bits 
that belong exclusively to other specific individuals, then not only will we 
limit the sorts of shared action we engage in, but we will drastically limit 
our ability to reform our inherited schemes of cooperation for the better. 
(266)  
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The organization of society in Oryx and Crake does not include a sense of shared 
responsibility, one hallmark of democracy. Baier warns that this kind of social 
organization “degenerates into lawgiving by some elite, accompanied by a willing 
subjection of the rest . . . if we cannot find [more worthy versions of equality and mutual 
respect] we should be willing to be called revolutionaries” (267).  
Snowman reflects on his inability to recognize the need for change: “he can’t 
describe himself, the way he’d been. Not unmarked—events had marked him, he’d had 
his own scars, his dark emotions . . . There had been something willed about it though, 
his ignorance. Or not willed, exactly: structured. He’d grown up in walled spaces, and 
then he had become one. He had shut things out” (184). Jimmy simply conforms to the 
role society has set for him. His career choice demonstrates the pervasive reach of market 
values into every area of life. He has an opportunity to study the arts and humanities, but 
as disciplines of study they are judged by society as worth only as much as they can 
produce in economic terms. Graduating high school with poor math and science scores, 
he attends Martha Graham Academy, an arts and humanities college where the studies 
concentrate on disciplines “no longer central to anything” (187). His studies do not teach 
him how to frame conceptual ideas, a technique that offers the arts and humanities 
flexibility, creativity, and contemporary relevance. The only application for Jimmy’s 
degree, or any degree from Martha Graham, was advertising, “decorating the cold, hard, 
numerical real world in flossy 2-D verbiage” (188). Jimmy will become a tool of 
oppression. His talent for words is destined to be used to promote the biotech industry; in 
this society, there is no other practical use for words.  
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Gillie Bolton writes of the critical need for the arts and humanities to “retain an 
intrinsic value, and not become “instrumental technologies” (as a mere means to 
promoting, for example, communication skills)” or scientific advances that may be risky 
or dangerous (2003). Jimmy’s first job with the AnooYoo compound is instrumental, 
involving writing promotional material for self-improvement items, “not books any more 
. . . [but] the equipment and the alternative medicines you needed in order to get the 
optimum effect” (245). Personal fulfillment, according to the AnooYoo compound, 
would not come from mental effort at attaining happiness, but on chemicals and 
technology utilized to change your biological state. Later, Jimmy goes to work for Crake 
at his Paradice Dome, writing the advertising campaign for the BlyssPlus pill.  
 Jimmy’s inability to apply his talent for words to reconceive how the organization 
of society is structured is also hampered by Crake’s failure to respond to Jimmy’s ideas. 
In a caring relationship, the value of responsiveness is required on the part of the cared-
for, in order to support the needs of those who do the work of care. This concept can also 
be applied to unequal friendships, such as the one between Crake and Jimmy. Crake 
refers to the years when he and Jimmy developed their friendship as “definitive times” 
(300). These were the years that Jimmy, the word man, learned to defer to Crake, the 
scientist, and the relationship between them grew into a power relationship that was 
fundamentally uncaring. Occasionally attempting to “defend the art-and-creativity turf,” 
Jimmy will challenge Crake’s assumptions about his notions of biological determinism 
(166). “When any civilization is dust and ashes . . . art is all that’s left over. Images, 
words, music. Imaginative structures. Meaning—human meaning, that is—is defined by 
them . . . Jimmy would have liked to have said, why are you always putting me down? 
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But he was afraid of the possible answers, because it’s so easy being one of them” (167). 
While Jimmy challenges Crake on rare occasions, he never actually ‘wins’ the argument; 
Crake does not even seem to value Jimmy’s opinions, a marker of the missing reciprocity 
in their relationship as ‘best friends’ and Crake’s lack of responsiveness to Jimmy’s 
feelings and opinions.  
 Their teenage years were also ones in which they had almost no caring parental 
supervision or guidance. Crake’s mother is characterized as a robot. When fixing a snack 
for Jimmy and Crake, sometimes she would “stop in the middle of her preparations—the 
dumping of stale crackers on a plate . . . –and stand stock still, as if she could see 
someone else in the room. Jimmy had the impression she couldn’t remember his name; 
not only that, she couldn’t remember Crake’s name either” (88). Like Jimmy’s father, 
“Uncle Pete,” Crake’s stepfather, was rarely home. The parents of Jimmy and Crake fail 
to care, and it seems that Jimmy and Crake, for the most part, raise themselves.  
Lacking parental care, Jimmy and Crake entertained themselves with pursuits 
wholly unsuitable for children or teenagers, which helped to form Crake’s ideas about the 
problems of humanity; the education they received stressing the biological sciences and 
math led Crake to work out a technological solution to social problems. Together, while 
getting high, Jimmy and Crake played violent battle games like “Blood and Roses” or 
“Barbarian Stomp,” or “trading games” that echo themes of commodification and 
economics, only with human atrocities and human achievements as relevant items of 
trade (77-8). When they weren’t playing games, they surfed the internet, looking at sites 
like “hedsoff.com, which played live coverage of executions in Asia,” or alibooboo.com, 
with various supposed thieves having their hands cut off and adulterers and lipstick-
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wearers being stoned to death by howling crowds,” or “[s]hortcircuit.com, 
brainfrizz.com, and deathrowlive.com” (82-3). They would also watch porn, even 
stealing Uncle Pete’s private code for “the more disgusting and forbidden sites” (85). 
Jimmy notes that “his parental units—supposing they were there, and downstairs—never 
seemed to notice a thing” (87). Their relationship is one of shared spectacle rather than 
true friendship; Jimmy recalls that “these sessions would take place for the most part in 
silence” (86). Jimmy even defines the friendship in economic terms, hoping to “build up 
some gratitude equity” with Crake by helping him get a girl (73). As illustrated in the 
relationship between Jimmy and Crake, the uncaring environment of the compounds 
extends to familial and personal relationships.  
As a result of their activities, Jimmy and Crake learn to commodify and to view 
human suffering as a fabricated creation designed for entertainment. Their first encounter 
with Oryx was watching her on the “hottots” website, as she performed an act that 
“involved whipped cream and a lot of licking” as well as fear and crying (90). Jimmy 
supposed, “they were supposed to look like that . . . this was a feature of the site. There 
were at least three layers of contradictory make-believe, one on top of the other. I want 
to, I want to not, I want to” (italics in original 90). Oryx looks right at the camera, “right 
into Jimmy’s eyes, into the secret person inside him. I see you, that look said. I see you 
watching. I know what you want” (91). Oryx, by returning the male gaze, demands her 
subjectivity and makes Jimmy feel “that what they’d been doing was wrong” for the first 
time (91). At the same time, he “felt hooked through the gills: if he’d been offered instant 
teleportation to wherever Oryx was he’d have taken it, no question” (91). Jimmy’s 
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reaction to her returned gaze marks his empathy for her, as well as his desire for a 
different conceptual framework for his life and the world he lives in. 
Despite activities that objectify others and tolerate oppression and suffering, 
Jimmy feels an inexplicable pull towards Oryx, who refused to allow him to simply see 
her or other girls who are like her as objects to be commodified. Years later when they 
are together, Jimmy shows her the still photo Crake took of the moment she gazed back 
at him, and asked her if it really is her, “Look! It’s your eyes!” he says. “A lot of girls 
have eyes,” she said. “A lot of girls did these things. Very many.” (91). Her point is that a 
lot of people are like her—uncared for, exploited, and lacking basic human rights—but 
there is no empathy spared for them because of societal fixation on desire and individual 
preference. Had Jimmy developed a care ethic within a more caring and democratic 
society, coupled with an ability to reconceptualize the social world with his talent for 
language, then it is likely that he would have been able to make a proactive response with 
caring motivations, rather than regret his lack of action when it is too late.  
Crake and Jimmy learn to suppress feelings of empathy that might make them 
more caring towards each other as well as other persons. Empathy is a critical relational 
capacity for understanding the feelings of other people. Crake is able to suppress this 
capacity through his scientific faith in genetic determinism. Jimmy learns to suppress 
empathy because it is not valued in society. This tendency to suppress feelings, 
presumably to make them feel more masculine, also fits with the conception of liberal 
autonomy that privileges rational thought over emotional engagement. When someone he 
cares for is depressed or sad, Jimmy thinks offering “words of comfort [to be] 
superfluous” (212). For Crake, the effect is to desensitize him to suffering, which later 
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allows him to develop his Paradice project through to completion. When Crake’s mother 
is dying from exposure to a “hot bioform” which physically melts her body, he describes 
her final moments with absolutely no affect:  
She was in isolation and losing shape rapidly. Crake couldn’t go in to see 
her, of course—nobody could, everything in there was done with robotic 
arms, as in nuclear-materials procedures—but he could watch her through 
the observation window. . . “It was impressive, Crake told Jimmy. “Froth 
was coming out” . . . His mother was supposed to be able to speak her last 
words to him via the mike system, said Crake, but there was a digital 
failure; so though he could see her lips moving, he couldn’t hear what she 
was saying. “Otherwise put, just like daily life,” said Crake. (177) 
 
In disbelief of Crake’s callousness, Jimmy “didn’t understand . . . the thought of Crake 
watching his own mother dissolve like that. He himself wouldn’t have been able to do it” 
(177). Crake’s childhood and his scientific worldview contributes to his lack of 
compassion for others, which ultimately drives his scientific work in the Paradice Project. 
Jimmy maintains an emotional connection with his physically distant mother. A target for 
the CorpSeCorps, they eventually catch up with her. In order to confirm that it was really 
her they had captured, they show Jimmy the video of her execution. His emotional 
reaction to the video confirms their suspicions, despite Jimmy’s attempt to hide his 
feelings.  
 Like Jimmy, Crake is raised by uncaring parents, but unlike Jimmy, he has the 
talents for math and science that are valued by society. Crake has what we might call the 
social and intellectual capital to change the social world of Oryx and Crake, but not in a 
way that is caring, relational in nature, or considerate of others. Crake is encouraged not 
to think in relational terms, or even develop significant relationships with other people.  
As a science-math whiz, Crake is treated as a VIP throughout his schooling, in contrast to 
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Jimmy, who is considered a “serf” when he visits Crake, the “nobility,” at college. (198). 
At the Watson-Crick Institute, Crake can simply request anything he wants from Student 
Services, including sex, and have it delivered. Relationships between students at Watson-
Crick is discouraged, although it is referred to by Crake as “pair bonding . . . I can’t waste 
time in unproductive random scanning” (207). Through this service, he requests Oryx. 
Sold by her mother as a child sex slave to keep the rest of the family from starving, Oryx 
manages to make sexual “trades” in order to learn English and be sold to someone in the 
U.S. After he “requests” her from Student Services, Crake convinces her to stay. She 
becomes Crake’s research assistant and lover when he starts his job at RejoovenEsense 
Compound.  
In this society that values science and technology above all others, Crake is given 
a high level of research autonomy at the RejoovenEsense Compound, characterized by 
his self-imposed isolation within the compound community. Crake stands in for the self-
interested, self-governing, rational actor of liberal autonomy. He designs the Paradice 
Dome and negotiates with RejoovenEsense for his own security, so that CorpSeCorps 
would not be allowed in. Inside the dome, Crake “was obviously the biggest ant in the 
anthill . . . there was a lot of deferential smiling and –this wasn’t faked—a lot of awe” 
(298). There is no one above Crake to oversee his research, other than investors, whose 
greed is exploited by Crake. He uses the social order, manipulating the values of the 
market in order to achieve what he truly thinks is a humanitarian vision. The “Crakers,” 
his genetically engineered, transgenic replacement for humanity, represent all that is 
caring, and all that is missing in the social world Crake and Jimmy grew up in. The goal 
of the Paradice project as it is articulated to Crake’s employers and investors, is to 
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produce babies made to order, ultimately resulting in whole populations created with pre-
selected characteristics, including “beauty, of course . . . and docility: several world 
leaders had expressed interest in that” (304). Crake’s ulterior motive is to simply remove 
humanity with its inherent problems of competition and individualism. In addition to 
giving them additional protection against environmental hazards,11  he designs his models 
based on what he observes are particular problems of the human race, problems in caring 
relationships including personal, sexual, familial, and social. The replacement race, the 
Crakers, would function as a corrective to the individualistic, liberal, market-driven 
society that caused so much harm.  
 The Crakers’ inherently relational traits downsize long-term commitments and 
responsibilities for individual would-be parents, and eliminate sexual and resource-based 
competition. Sexual relationships among the Crakers are communal and fertility is 
cyclical. When a woman enters a fertile cycle, she mates with several men after some 
simple group mating rituals, “it no longer matters who the father of the inevitable child 
may be, since there’s no more property to inherit, no father-son loyalty required for war. 
Sex is no longer a mysterious rite, viewed with ambivalence or downright loathing, 
conducted in the dark and inspiring suicides and murders. Now it’s more like an athletic 
demonstration, a free-spirited romp” (165).  The children grow at accelerated rates; at the 
age of four, they are comparable to teenagers, so there is no need for women to be over-
burdened for many years with care-work of small children.  
                                                 
11 The Crakers have biological insect repellent, their skin is able to resist radiation from the sun, and they 
are herbivores, so hunting and killing are unnecessary, other than hunting fish for Snowman. 
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 The behavioral characteristics of the Crakers, engineered through genetics, 
function as correctives to the society that previously inhabited the earth. Unlike 
humanity, which separated groups within society, the Crakers accept Snowman. 
“They’ve accepted [his] monstrousness . . . [and] known from the beginning he was a 
separate order of being” (101). When Snowman decides to leave the beach where they all 
live to get food and supplies from the compounds, the men try to convince him that he 
must let them accompany him in order to keep him safe from predators. Upon his return 
to them, they purr over his injured foot in an attempt to heal him. While they recognize 
that Snowman is not like them, the Crakers care for him as if he were one of them. They 
are attentive to differences in Snowman’s character, responsive to his needs for food and 
for physical care and are competent in providing care, and recognize their relationship 
with him as important to them. The Crakers care about the “Other.”  
 Unfortunately, Crake’s solution to the uncaring world—our possible, near future 
world in Atwood’s vision—is ultimately as ineffective as the underground political 
activities of Sharon. The destruction of humanity is not a viable solution to problems of 
care. While we may think of Jimmy as the foil to Crake, Sharon is the mirror for the mad 
scientist. Where she engages in a political community in order to promote shared goals, 
Crake—like Dr. Frankenstein—isolates himself and separates his activities from the 
concerns of society. Carrying out subversive political activities that are motivated by a 
metaphysical sense of care for humanity, Sharon sees that collective action, even if 
considered illegal, is the only way to change the world. Her failure was due to the fact 
that before things got so bad, people did not recognize the need for civil society or for 
politics to keep up with economics. In contrast to Sharon, Crake believes that one man 
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can change it all—he can—and he works within the system to do so, with catastrophic 
results. Crake is motivated by a twisted sense of care, evident in the creatures he 
creates—transgenic humans Jimmy calls the “Crakers,”—who exhibit all the caring 
tendencies missing in the social world of the human race.  
Shaped by the society he lives in, Jimmy’s paralysis, his inability to change, is 
cured once the society that fostered it is broken. The final pages of the novel indicate that 
there may be hope for the world, not because Jimmy is there with the Crakers, but 
because there are other humans who survived, and collectively they might begin to build 
a new society that recognizes the relational interdependence of all living things—both 
human and nonhuman. In order to do this, they will have to start with a shared vision of a 
civic relationship that includes a strong care ethic in order to ensure their mutual survival. 
This outcome is left open at the close of the novel, when Jimmy weighs his choice of 
words as he approaches a ragged trio of survivors—“I can show you much treasure,” or 
“I come in peace”—a choice between the ethos of the market and the ethos of care—
treasure or peace (374). His thoughts illustrate the choice he will make. He knows he 
cannot make the decision alone and asks the ghosts of his mother and of Oryx, “what do 
you want me to do?” (374). Despite his isolation, he thinks in relational terms. Despite 
the purposefully ambiguous ending Atwood provides, it seems as if Jimmy will approach 
the other survivors and work out both a collective understanding of their history and their 
future.  
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Never Let Me Go12 
 
Tronto declares that making the “Other” matter is the most difficult moral quality to 
establish in practice (1993b, 130). The question of what is human and what is not is a 
central one for Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go. The “Other” is this novel is the clone. 
In order to clarify when I am speaking about clones in Ishiguro’s novel, and when I am 
speaking of non-clones (as this question is ambiguous in the novel), I will refer to clones 
as clones, and non-clones as humans. However, this practice should not be taken as 
defining terms of opposition. The entire point of the book is to question the distinction 
between our understanding of human and non-human. In our reading of Never Let Me 
Go, we identify with Kathy H. the narrator; however, she is a clone, and is “Othered” by 
the society she lives in. Kathy H. and the entire clone community are denied basic human 
rights; instead they are treated as organ factories. Their status as a member of the human 
race is in question, although Kathy’s narrative voice makes it fairly clear that clones are 
human. One of the central questions in the development of contemporary care ethics is 
how to “spin the web of relationships widely enough that some are not beyond its reach” 
(Tronto 1993b, 250). In Ishiguro’s novel, the web is small and narrow, and human rights 
are not highlighted as a paradigm for clone rights. The narration is from a clone’s point of 
view, involving seemingly mundane details of teenage life, but in the voice for an 
                                                 
12 As with Oryx and Crake, literary criticism on Never Let Me Go is limited, and  irrelevant to my topic. In 
addition to Keith McDonald’s “Days of Past Futures: Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go as “Speculative 
Memoir,”” (2007), which is mentioned in the text, academic criticism includes Deborah P. Britzman’s “On 
Being a Slow Reader: Psychoanalytic Reading Problems in Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go,” (2006), which 
suggests that in the process of reading the novel we are confronted with an internal world of object 
relations (the clones) and our affective representations about our own fears of objectivity. Wai‐chew Sim 
includes a chapter on the utopian characteristics of Never Let Me Go in his collection of essays on 
Ishiguro’s work (2006).   
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oppressed Other who, as the reader gradually learns, is considered undeserving of rights 
or care in her society.  
The novel points out how oppression and cruelty are tolerated by many different 
groups. In contrast to the genetic determinism that guides their fates as organ donors, 
social determinism prevents the clones in Ishiguro’s novel to claim their rights as 
citizens. The values of a society and the particular groups one belong to shape the 
thoughts, actions, and attitudes of individuals; for these clones, there is not an opportunity 
for any sense of autonomy. At the same time, Ishiguro’s clones are trapped within their 
bodies, defined by their bodies, yet curiously disembodied by the style of the narration.  
Ishiguoro’s clones are feminized and, like women in a patriarchal society, denied any role 
apart from their physical function in the wider society, denied basic rights, and denied 
even their own souls.  This scenario is a familiar one for oppressed women in feminist 
theory.  Susan Moller Okin writes of how, in traditional philosophy and in the history of 
political thought, “philosophers who, in laying the foundation for their political theories, 
have asked, ‘What are men like?’ ‘What is man’s potential?’ have frequently, in turning 
to the female sex, asked, ‘What are women for?’” (10). A similar question could be asked 
of the status of Ishiguro’s clones; they are not considered to have personal potential or a 
“nature,” of any kind.  Their purpose—what are clones for?—is purely instrumental for 
humans. 
Like Atwood’s U.S., Ishiguro’s U.K. is a divided society; there are regular 
humans, and there are clones. They live separately, and although known to each other, 
neither group understands how they are interconnected. Clones are raised to express 
strong feminine care ethic toward “normal” humans rather than a feminist care ethic, 
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which would provide them with contextual, relational, and critical thinking tools to care 
for themselves. The feminine ethic of care embodied in the clones is a perverse and 
oppressive ethic because of the context in which it develops, demonstrating how crucial a 
public, feminist care ethic is to a just society. A central question of Never Let Me Go is, 
can we care for people who are not like us, and if we can, how do we care for people who 
are not close to us or not like us? This text draws attention to the correlative 
responsibilities of rights-holders in a society and concludes that unless society cares 
about all of the groups that are included in its boundaries, justice is not possible.  
Ishiguro begins the chronology of the narrative in Never Let Me Go immediately 
following World War II in England. Told as a memoir of a clone, Kathy H., this story 
actually begins before her lifetime. In Ishiguro’s depiction of British society in post-
World War II, “great breakthroughs in science followed one after the other so rapidly, 
there wasn’t time to take stock, to ask the sensible questions” (262). While certainly true 
of real-world, post-war scientific developments, Ishiguro’s depiction of the 1950s and 
60s might stand in for our contemporary moment. In Ishiguro’s world,  
suddenly, there were all these new possibilities laid before us, all these 
ways to cure so many previously incurable conditions. That was what the 
world noticed the most, wanted the most . . . by the time people became 
concerned about [clones] . . . by then it was too late. How can you ask a 
world that has come to regard cancer as curable, how can you ask such a 
world to put away that cure, to go back to the dark days? (262-3).  
  
As in Oryx and Crake, there is a market for the products of biotechnology; in this case it 
is specifically clones for organs, but unlike Atwood’s novel, Ishiguro’s clones exist in a 
closed, government controlled biotechnology market. In the context of socialized 
medicine, government clinics run the donation program. British politicians have 
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separated clones from the general public, raising most of them in organ farm 
orphanages.13   
The narrative is framed by a political movement for clone rights that turns out to 
be a sham, because the activists who protest on behalf of clone rights refuse to fully 
concede their own status and power as members of a privileged group. They apply care 
ethics as a private, paternalistic ethic. The clones’ needs for care are not physical ones—
in fact, the clones’ physical needs are provided for with exceptional care so they can be 
organ donors. Never Let Me Go stresses the needs for psychological and developmental 
care that supports an adequate and autonomous self-conception and understanding that 
promotes just treatment. Self-care is denied to the clones through an education that is 
designed to isolate and “protect” them from knowledge of the outside world and from the 
fate that awaits them after they “graduate” from school.   
The founders of the Hailsham boarding school, a privileged clone school for 
experimental learning, were dependent upon contributions and gifts from private funders 
to continue their work in proving that clones did have souls, just like humans. The reason 
the school had to close was because of the “Morningdale Scandal,” caused by a rogue 
scientist whose work inflated public fears of cloning technologies through his private 
research. James Morningdale “carried on his work in a remote part of Scotland, where I 
suppose he thought he’d attract less attention” (263). Working on genetic enhancement of 
                                                 
13 We can deduce that this is a politically controlled market by noting that the persons invited to the clone 
art exhibits are politicians; also, in speculative fiction, there is an assumption that the society presented in 
the text is similar to reality.  In the UK, medicine is regulated in a socialized, government controlled 
system.  Morningdale, the rogue scientist, went to a different country to pursue his research, presumably 
because it would be closely watched and regulated politically in England. My reading of the society in 
Never Let Me Go does rely on the assumption of a government regulated medical industry.   
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the human body, Morningdale wanted to offer people the chance to create their own 
designer babies with “superior intelligence, superior athletic ability, that sort of thing . . . 
he’d taken his research much further than anyone before him, far beyond legal 
boundaries” (264). The possibility that genetically enhanced humans would try to take 
their place in general society was unthinkable to Ishiguro’s Britain—“that frightened 
people. They recoiled from that” (264). Morningdale was arrested and his research 
program stopped, but not before it had repercussions for clones, most of whom were 
raised in horrible conditions anyway. The Morningdale Scandal affected how the donors 
to the clone rights movement began to think about what could happen if clones took their 
rightful place in society. Funding for the Hailsham operation, as well as other schools like 
it, completely dried up. The public visibility that had been afforded the movement fades 
away. 
The majority of Kathy H.’s narrative in Never Let Me Go is her own personal 
memoir; however, there are moments in which we develop a picture of the society from 
which cloning develops and its abuses take place. Humans are aware of clones. The art 
that the students produce at Hailsham is intended to prove that clones have souls and 
deserve better treatment. The leaders of the movement—“Madame” and “Marie 
Claude”— “selected the best of it and put on special exhibitions. In the late seventies, at 
the height of [their] influence, [they] were organizing large events all around the country. 
There’d be cabinet ministers, bishops, all sorts of famous people coming to attend. There 
were speeches and large funds pledged” (262). Yet a lack of social care is evident, for 
despite the fact that most clones “are being reared in deplorable conditions . . . [people’s] 
overwhelming concern was that their own children, their spouses, their parents, their 
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friends, did not die from cancer, motor neurone disease, heart disease” (261, 263). Before 
the Morningdale scandal, the clone rights movement had met with some success and 
support, challenging “the entire way the donations programme was being run” (261). The 
society from which cloning emerges is one in which the government is highly influential 
to individual health and social well-being.  
Atwood’s novel suggests that political intervention through demands made by 
civic associations in the biotechnology market would alleviate some of the harms that 
arise. In contrast, Ishiguro’s novel shows that not any kind of democratic politics is 
sufficient; it must be a politics that includes social values of care that are engaged and 
practiced by the general public. The clone art exhibitions indicate that there is a public 
venue for civic discourse; but it is not the general public that is attentive, perhaps by 
design of the clone rights leadership. While Atwood’s novel suggests that the missing 
ingredient in the market is government control, Ishiguro’s depiction of a politically 
controlled market shows how governmental control of a market is not enough; citizens 
must care enough to demand the governing decisions that enable a caring society. The 
result of the political intervention into cloning in Never Let Me Go is a society that is 
comparable with systemic patriarchal ones—just as women were once ruled by their 
supposed “biological destiny,” clones are likewise “stuck” in their proscribed roles. 
Assumed not to be human at all, they are unable to even recognize what an alternative 
might look like.  
 Clones are raised so that they understand their place in society as destined to care 
for humans in everything that they do, whether that is donating organs or simply caring 
about how humans feel. This is not reciprocated. Kathy H. expresses surprise when she 
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finds out details about the politics of cloning. She asks, “[w]hy did you have to prove 
something like that . . . did someone think we didn’t have souls?” (260), and “[why 
would] people want students treated so badly in the first place?” (262). Clones are not 
educated to understand how greater society works; they are left in the dark about how 
humans live. Any place “beyond Hailsham was like a fantasy land; we had only the 
haziest notions of the world outside and about what was and wasn’t possible there” (66). 
Still, normal people and clones intermixed in society. In a lecture to students about 
having sex on the “outside,” Miss Emily, the head guardian of Hailsham school, tells 
students that they always must be careful having sex because of the risk of STDs, but “we 
had to be extremely careful about having sex . . . with people who weren’t students, 
because out there sex means all sorts of things” (83-4). The emotions that clones may feel 
are subordinated to those of normal persons. Clones are taught to always remember that 
on the outside, the rules for living are different and they are expected to conform to them 
while protecting the sensibilities of humans.  
Despite being free to travel or interact with humans, the clones maintain their 
close group association after they leave school; they do not engage in the wider social 
world of England, and so they continue to remain ignorant of their places in society and 
outside the boundaries of civic discourse. Kathy does not include in her narrative any 
direct interaction with a human other than the guardians, even after students graduate 
from Hailsham to go to “the Cottages,” half-way houses for clones where they live for a 
while between school and their time as organ donors. Clones are free to travel anywhere 
they want to; Kathy, Ruth, and Tommy all go to Norfolk to look for Ruth’s “possible,” 
the person from whom she was cloned, and during the trip they shop in department stores 
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and interact with normal people. They are secretive about who they are; they simply 
claim when asked that they are “students,” which is what they have been called in clone 
society their entire lives.  
 Although clones are trained to intermix with humans, humans do not appear to be 
physically aware of clones, although it appears that they are aware of the existence of 
clones. There are no physical markers that identify them as clones, and clones do not 
disclose who they are to humans. Humans are frightened of the idea of a cloned person, 
which the students at Hailsham figure out fairly quickly. When Madame comes to collect 
student art for an exhibit, Kathy’s group of friends decides to test their suspicion that 
Madame is afraid of them. After purposely surrounding her in a hallway, they realized 
she was afraid; “she was afraid of us in the same way someone might be afraid of spiders 
. . . it never occurred to us to wonder how we would feel, being seen like that, being the 
spiders” (italics in original, 35). The fear inherent in Madame’s attitude towards the 
clones, as well as the guardians’ inability to fully disclose to them their tragic fates, is 
also indicative of their unwillingness to fully acknowledge the clones’ full humanity. The 
public attitude towards clones appears to be one of indifference. Despite the art shows, 
and public knowledge of clones as organ donors, no one challenges the hierarchy of care 
that exists. The government takes care of everyone, although with discriminatory policies 
that deny rights to clones; humans take care of humans; clones take care of clones. Each 
group is indifferent and unacknowledged by other groups.  
Feminized care values that promote self-sacrifice or martyrdom for others through 
carework become the only set of values Ishiguro’s clones can cling to; they have no 
“right” to claim unjust treatment that they know of, affirming Held’s claim that without a 
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social care ethic, rights are simply not possible. Their education stresses this perverse 
care ethic in personal and public ways, much like girls have been traditionally raised in 
the nuclear family,14  the clones are urged to care for themselves physically, and taught 
that their mission in life is to help all of humanity. This is an oppressive ethic of care, 
forced on a group of people in society that extends all the way down to simple touching; 
though they are together for almost their entire lives, “we didn’t do things like hug each 
other” (76). Students have weekly physical exams, are discouraged from touching, and 
exhorted not to ever smoke cigarettes or engage in risky sexual behavior. Miss Lucy, one 
the guardians, tells them, “keeping yourselves well, keeping yourselves very healthy 
inside, that’s much more important for each of you than it is for me” (69). She does not 
attempt to tell them that the reason for good health is to be good donors. Clones do not 
understand the full implications of their education. They do know that someday they will 
have to “donate,” but the guardians’ use of euphemisms shield the students from full 
understanding. “Death” is replaced by the term “complete,” but the concept of 
“completing” is not fully understood until after they become carers for donors. The clone 
students do not question their guardians. The guardians’ misguided attempt to raise 
political awareness of clone rights never includes directly informing the clones 
themselves of their oppressive circumstances or helping them to help themselves as a 
collective group. This is not a “mistake” or part of an ill-advised care ethic on the part of 
the school founders, but an inability for guardians to truly see the clone students as their 
                                                 
14 Nancy Chodorow’s 1978 work, The Reproduction of Mothering, demonstrates how women’s supposed 
“natural” affinity for childcare and the work of motherhood is not innate but socially constructed, and 
“reproduces” from generation to generation through “social‐structurally induced psychological 
mechanisms” (211). 
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equals—as fully human beings. The care relationship between guardians and clones is a 
power relationship, and the values of care are distorted through this power dynamic. 
While they secretly wish for guardians to express emotional feelings for them as 
individuals, the clones turn toward each other for care, but this care is also inadequate 
because of their own limited competencies for providing adequate care. 
Keith McDonald notes that in typical biographical memoirs, schooling is “an 
experience that informs and sets a template for adult life, here the focus is on Hailsham 
because this is the only experience of any relative normality, family, and co-existence. 
While in Hailsham, the students willingly participate in a denial of both the outside world 
and their futures” (78). Student “cliques” are formed as an alternative to family 
structures. These groups of students police behavior and encourage conformity to group 
values. When one student, Marge K., says something that embarrasses her group of 
friends, they “punish her by hauling her out of bed, holding her face against the window 
pane and ordering her to look up at the woods” (51). The woods were symbolic of the 
outside world, that “cast a shadow over the whole of Hailsham” (50). Rumors circulated 
of a student who hopped the fence to see what was beyond Hailsham, then “when she 
tried to get back in, she wasn’t allowed” (50). There is an implicit understanding that 
group membership was extremely important, and the most horrific fate for anyone was to 
be isolated and alone. Hailsham provided the clones that were raised there with a sense of 
normalcy and belonging in some ways; in other ways, it sheltered them from 
understanding their fate and developing an individual identity and formulating a sense of 
self. Clones’ senses of themselves are completely wrapped up in their group membership. 
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There is no opportunity for any of the clones to develop autonomous selves—either in the 
individualistic liberal sense or the relational sense. 
Care ethics describes autonomy as a relational condition that ebbs and flows 
throughout life that contrasts with liberal theory’s attention to self-government and 
independence. For the clones of Never Let Me Go, there is no opportunity to develop a 
sense of themselves as separate from the rest of the clone society. An exclusively 
relational autonomy is no better than the essentialist liberal conception. The clones of 
Hailsham are strictly socially determined. Being isolated at Hailsham or one of the other 
various orphanages for clones around the country, there is no other social world from 
which to draw from to imagine an alternative existence. When future speculation begins 
to occur, it is stopped dead in its tracks. Up until their last year at Hailsham, the clones do 
not fully understand what their lives will be like. Miss Lucy stops Peter, one of the clones 
at Hailsham, when he is talking with another boy about “what it would feel like if we 
became actors. What sort of life it would be” (80). She tells the entire group of students, 
“none of you will go to America, none of you will be film stars. And none of you will be 
working in supermarkets as I heard some of you planning the other day . . . if you’re to 
have decent lives, you have to know who you are and what lies ahead of you, every one 
of you” (81). They are taught that their only chance for a decent life is to understand how 
they must give up that life. They are treated as “mere means” to an end, rather than as an 
end in themselves.  
Group dynamics are a powerful theme in Never Let Me Go. Margaret Atwood 
remarks in a review of the novel, “One motif at the very core of [the novel] is the 
treatment of out-groups, and the way out-groups form in-groups, even among themselves. 
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The marginalized are not exempt from doing their own marginalization: Even as they die, 
Ruth and Tommy and the other donors form a proud, cruel little clique, excluding Kathy 
H. because, not being a donor yet, she can’t really understand” (2005). Kathy still 
considers Ruth and Tommy her best friends. No attempt to communicate their shared 
existence is expended in their attempts to be considered “normal.” This demonstrates the 
possible problems inherent in Sara Ruddick’s conception of carework involving training 
children to be socially acceptable, and the need for a constant critique of caring practices 
so that they are effective. A social care ethic would encourage communication and 
understanding between its members, rather than frustrated resignation characterized by 
divisiveness.  
While clones form groups to substitute for families, they fail to develop caring 
practices that are often found in families. For Ishiguro’s clones, there is no solid group 
affinity because the rules for behavior continually change. For example, Ruth is quick to 
adopt behaviors of whatever group she happens to be involved with. At the Cottages, 
when couples parted they did not kiss each other goodbye, but slapped each other on the 
arm, so Ruth began to slap Tommy on the arm as a goodbye. “Tommy didn’t have a clue 
what was going on, and would turn abruptly to Ruth and go: ‘What?,’ so that she’d have 
to glare furiously at him . . . after a week or so they were managing to do it right, more or 
less exactly like veteran couples” (121-2). When Kathy challenges Ruth’s behavior by 
claiming “that’s not how it works in real families,” she responds with passive aggression, 
telling her “you’re upset because I’ve managed to move on, make new friends . . . You 
can’t expect me to hold your hand all the time” (124). Kathy is excluded from Ruth’s 
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new group of friends, just as the clone community as a whole is excluded from the 
benefits of being included as a valid member of a political group of citizens. 
The first value of care ethics is being open and attentive to potential problems of 
the needs for care. Unless this first criterion of care is met, then care will be inadequate or 
nonexistent. Tommy, who feels the need for self-care even though he cannot articulate it, 
is the only clone that appears subject to what Alisson Jaggar has termed “outlaw 
emotions.” Jaggar writes, “People who experience conventionally unacceptable, or what I 
call ‘outlaw,’ emotions often are subordinated individuals who pay a disproportionately 
high price for maintaining the status quo . . . when [these] are experienced by isolated 
individuals, those concerned may be confused, unable to name their experience; they may 
even doubt their own sanity” (Jaggar 396). Tommy frequently engages in emotional 
outbursts, which are regarded by the other clones as alternatively amusing and disturbing. 
As a joke, other clones tend to provoke him to rages. In one such example early in the 
novel, Kathy recalls other boys laughing at him because he was picked last for teams, and 
“Tommy burst into thunderous bellowing . . . he began to scream and shout, a 
nonsensical jumble of swear words and insults” (9). At the close of the novel, after 
Tommy and Kathy find out about the clone rights movement, just before Tommy donates 
his fourth and final organ, Kathy speculates, “ ‘back then, at Hailsham, when you used to 
go bonkers like that, and we couldn’t understand it . . . I was thinking maybe the reason 
you used to get like that was because at some level you always knew’ ” He responds, 
“maybe I did know, somewhere deep down. Something the rest of you didn’t” (275).  
Jaggar describes outlaw emotions as the “first indications that something is wrong with 
the way alleged facts have been constructed, with accepted understandings of how things 
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are. Conventionally unexpected or inappropriate emotions may precede our conscious 
recognition that accepted descriptions and justifications often conceal as much as reveal 
the prevailing state of affairs” (Jaggar 397). Frustratingly, this conscious recognition of 
the unjust state of affairs is never realized, never acted upon, never questioned.  
Jaggar’s articulation of outlaw emotions are related to care ethics in the need to be 
attentive to contexts in which care might be needed. Attentiveness is a primary value of 
care ethics, that requires recognizing potential problems when they arise. That clones at 
Hailsham do not recognize the injustice present in their lives may be a result of 
inattentiveness in the social world they live in, and can be extended to the broader social 
realm of the nation. If there were national attention and civic debate about the injustice of 
cloning persons for organ harvesting, then it seems reasonable that the lack of care and 
justice in this health program would also be brought to the attention of the clones 
themselves, who would then be able to think critically about how to change their lives.  
In addition to the four core values of care articulated by Tronto (attentiveness, 
responsibility, competence, and responsiveness), to develop a suitable social ethic of care 
critical thought must take place. This element of caring practices is missing at Hailsham. 
Care ethics is practiced within a particular context, with the attributes, needs, and desires 
of actual persons taken into consideration. As Held claims, “We can hope [that] feelings 
of solidarity will be extended to all persons everywhere, sufficiently to see their rights 
respected and their needs addressed. But it may be the value of care as much as the value 
of justice that can help this happen” (132). In their particular context, the rest of the 
clones ridicule Tommy for his acting out. The guardians view it as an expression of his 
frustration in creative pursuits. Tommy himself doesn’t understand why he loses control 
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of his emotions. They are never subject to serious examination by anyone, until much 
later when Kathy and Tommy understand the broader context of their situation.  
As mentioned earlier, critical thought and reflection are necessary for appropriate 
application of the values and practices of care. Creative work has the potential for 
inspiring caring values and raising creative solutions, but this is not allowed to develop in 
the clones at Hailsham because of the inherent power differences between clones and 
their guardians. Creativity is encouraged in the clone students for dual purposes, the first 
being for art exhibitions for the public to prove that clones had souls. The second 
motivation for providing clone students with a strong arts and humanities background is 
the hope that the clones will be able to lose themselves and forget their destinies by 
engaging in creative work. This is a privatized care ethic that is effectively paternalistic, a 
primary danger of both private and public forms of care ethics, according to Tronto 
(1993a, 170). Miss Emily discloses to Kathy H. and Tommy that they did not think it in 
the students’ best interests to understand the contexts of their lives: “We had run 
Hailsham for many years, we had a sense of what could work, what was best for the 
students in the long run, beyond Hailsham” (267). Protectionism of clones is an 
ineffective political solution to clone rights; it allows the guardians to think that 
happiness in a life is more important than having a self-inspired purpose or a valued point 
of view about what is needed.  
Paternalist applications of care ethics occurs when “care-givers may well come to 
see themselves as more capable of assessing the needs of care-receivers than are the care-
receivers themselves” (Tronto 1993a, 170). Paternalist care is brought about by failure to 
communicate and from the power relationships that can exist when the cared-for is 
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vulnerable to the care-provider. One guardian recognizes the dangers of paternal 
applications of care and addresses it with her students, although she later gets fired for it. 
Miss Lucy attempts to correct her previous advice to Tommy that he need not be creative 
if he doesn’t feel like it. For some undisclosed reason, however, she cannot tell him 
openly how to use his knowledge, likely because she knew her job would be in danger. 
She exhorts, “Look, there are all kinds of things you don’t understand, Tommy, and I 
can’t tell you about them. Things about Hailsham, about your place in the wider world, 
all kinds of things. But perhaps one day, you’ll try and find out. They won’t make it 
easier for you, but if you want to, really want to, you might find out . . . But why should 
you be any different? The students who leave here, they never find out much. Why 
should you be any different?” (108-9). Unsure why she suddenly wants him to “create,” 
Tommy assures her, “I’ll be all right, Miss. I’m really fit, I know how to look after 
myself. When it’s time for donations, I’ll be able to do it really well” (108). Despite 
training in the creative arts and humanities, clone students learn it as an escape from real 
life. They never learn to think about themselves and why they must live as they do.  
Without critical thought and reflection on the part of both the care-providers and the 
cared-for, care ethics is a paternalist ethic that is oppressive and unjust. 
Paternalism is also evidenced in the type of education the clones receive from the 
guardians at the school. Details in the novel inform just how involved clones are in the 
kind of artistic and humanistic intellectual investigations that might inspire them to rebel. 
Kathy H. mentions reading Daniel Deronda, a Victorian novel by George Eliot that 
critiques the anti-Semitism of British society, with themes of national unity and self-
determination of peoples (122). Greg gives “speeches about Proust,” to anyone who will 
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listen at the Cottages (120), and Proust’s work involves issues of memory, physical 
infirmity, and cruel relationships. They also argue amongst themselves about the 
significance of Franz Kafka, who wrote of isolation and alienation in The 
Metamorphosis. The reason they never apply humanistic ideas to their own lives is that 
they were specifically trained not to do so. 
Miss Emily tells Kathy and Tommy towards the end of the novel, “We were able 
to give you something, something which even now no one will ever take from you, and 
we were able to do that principally by sheltering you . . . You built your lives on what we 
gave you. You wouldn’t be who you are today if we’d not protected you. You wouldn’t 
have become absorbed in your lessons, you wouldn’t have lost yourselves in your art and 
your writing” (268). Miss Lucy, Kathy H.’s favorite guardian, was fired for wanting to 
tell students what lay in store for them, which would have effectively challenged the 
power structure of the clone-rights group and given clones a chance to change their lives. 
Tommy reflects to Kathy H., “I think Miss Lucy was right, not Miss Emily,” and then 
exhibits a final moment of uncontrolled rage in a deserted field before he returns to his 
clinic to finish his donations (273). 
There are other moments in the text when clones as a collective group gravitate 
towards a potentially inspiring metaphor for their oppressed lives, but their habit of 
excluding each other from experiences, and their formation of “in groups” and “out 
groups,” keeps all of them from fully realizing the meaning of their own interests. Late in 
the novel, when Kathy is a carer, and Ruth and Tommy have moved on to donating their 
organs, the entire clone community obsesses over visiting a dilapidated boat stranded in a 
bog out in the English countryside. Kathy speculates, “God knows how these things 
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work. Sometimes it’s a particular joke. Sometimes a rumor. It travels from centre to 
centre, right the way across the country in a matter of days, and suddenly every donor’s 
talking about it. Well, this time it was to do with this boat . . . (216). The boat becomes a 
pilgrimage site for clones; for the reader it functions as a metaphor for the lives of the 
clones themselves. They, like the boat, are stuck in a way of life that they have no idea 
how to escape. It seems quite odd that anyone would be interested in traveling hours by 
car and then further by foot to see a broken boat stuck in a wild bog, but this is what they 
do, and the boat could represent an unconscious attempt to understand how they might 
attain their freedom; however, because art was taught as escapism rather than as a 
conceptual discipline, they fail to recognize the subconscious implications of what they 
see. 
They had to walk to see it, but the three friends, Ruth, Tommy, and Kathy H. 
manage to help each other make trip together. Walking through a boggy marsh, they 
reach a point when their feet start to sink into the ground and can go no further. As they 
view the boat from a distance, they talk about donating, and the possibility of not making 
it to four donations before they die. When Kathy H. attempts to reassure her friends that 
people do “come to terms with it,” Ruth claims that Kathy cannot possibly understand 
since she is a carer rather than a donor. Tommy tells them that he was a lousy carer, but a 
good donor, and Ruth remarks that, “it’s what we’re supposed to be doing, isn’t it?” 
(227). This attention to the ethics of duty is taken to an extreme by the clones in Never 
Let Me Go, a trait shared by characters in other Ishiguro novels such as The Remains of 
the Day (1989). Clones are raised to be eager to please, and to do their duty without 
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reflecting on the costs of that duty. This is another marker of the feminine care ethic that 
the clones live by.  
Following the trip to the boat, Ruth, whose death during her second donation is 
immanent, attempts to encourage Tommy and Kathy to approach Madame at her home 
and apply for a “deferral” from donating. The rumor was that clone couples who went to 
Hailsham, because they were special, could apply for a deferral if they could prove that 
they were in love—proof that came from their artistic endeavors. The guardians at 
Hailsham, however, did not see art as transformative in nature, and they trained the 
students in the arts and humanities so that they could “lose themselves” in the process, 
not transform their lives.  
The clones of Ishiguro’s Britain are unable, for a variety of reasons, to claim 
human rights for themselves. The onus of responsibility, however, is on the society that 
has recognized and then ignored the injustice of the organ donation program. This is a 
moral failure of a society that values individual rights and obligations that are only 
voluntarily undertaken; accompanying these rights must be a moral imperative to uphold 
human rights and a concept of human flourishing that is caring for others. A particular 
criticism of liberal theory by care ethics scholars is the missing correlation of 
responsibilities to rights. Tronto claims that the values of care “need not be restricted to 
the immediate objects of our care, but can also inform our practices as citizens” (1993a, 
168). If citizens in Ishiguro’s England recognized and attempted “an honest recognition 
of the intersection of needs and interests,” they would likely find that the interests of 
society were underwriting an oppressive and unjust health care regime, and subsequently 
“imagine vigorous challenges to assumptions that we are not responsible for misfortunes 
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that are distant from us. Public agencies may be held responsible for their policies or 
challenged for their incompetence” (Tronto 1993a, 168). And cloning would not be 
viewed as a just and fair solution for the problem of care in British society. 
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Final Speculations on Liberal Theory, Care Ethics, and Cloning 
 
Oryx and Crake and Never Let Me Go form a critique of the cloning cure for care. 
Alternative value systems, such as care ethics, might have provided a way for characters 
to change the narrative and prevent the destruction that takes place, but in both novels 
two failures prevent an alternative outcome: the failure of individuals, society, and 
politics to practice an ethic of care; and the failure to link creative, conceptual thinking 
with group or civic solutions to oppressive social and political practices. Care between 
the individual/familial, social, and political realms should be integrative and reciprocal. 
The scientists in these narratives interestingly embody the liberal autonomous subject; 
had they seen themselves as embedded in mutually sustaining relationships, we might 
speculate that their research programs would have been very different, subject to civic 
discourse and government policy that promoted its uses for social good. Had the 
relational conception of autonomy been widely accepted, social and political solutions to 
the problems of care could have been worked out contextually, with the particular needs 
addressed to avoid extreme solutions. If there had been a location for civic discussion of 
the problems of care in these societies, with the recognition that all persons are on equal 
moral standing, perhaps clones would not be thought of as so fundamentally different 
from humans. And finally, had the power dynamics that exist among the characters been 
highlighted, particularly those between the scientists and characters we might call 
“creative humanists,” the unjust quality of their respective situations may have been 
brought into the open and corrected. All of these issues could have been dealt with by a 
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stronger individual, social, and political care ethic that is valued in relation to, rather than 
subordinated to, liberal and scientific worldviews.  
 Feminist care ethics offers an alternative conception to human life that contrasts 
with liberal theory. Where liberal theory relies on a conception of persons as 
independent, rational, and self-interested, care ethics recognizes that persons are 
emotionally and socially embedded in personal and societal relationships that greatly 
affect how they choose to live. While care ethics began its development in recognizing 
women’s different moral voice, as it moves out of the private and into the social and 
political applications of the theory, we can see that in each relational aspect of life—
individual/familial, social, or political—care can be valued and practiced with profound 
implications for other areas of human life. A complete theory of care involves valuing 
and practicing a feminist care ethic in personal, familial, social, and political 
relationships. 
 In conclusion to this thesis, I would like to speculate on the possible advancement 
of a social and political ethic of care brought about through the imaginative application of 
the arts and humanities. Oryx and Crake, and Never Let Me Go suggest a conception of 
the arts and humanities as a valuable component to combating the problems inherent in 
liberalism and in technological determinism. The arts and humanities “offer critical civic 
competencies, ways of comprehending cultural and technological values, and the worlds 
such values conjur; in short, ways of world making. A world without the [arts and] 
humanities would be one in which science and technology knew no point of social 
reference, had lost their cultural compass and moral scope” (Davidson and Goldberg 
2004). As the ethics of care develops into a normative social and political theory, it can 
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advance the value of creativity, narrative understanding, and artistic expression while 
promoting the language and values of care in civic discourse that can be common and 
intelligible to everyone. In Oryx and Crake, the rhetoric of science functions to oppress 
critical application of the arts and humanities. At the same time, the market serves to 
silence needs for care in the family as well as in the larger community. A similar theme is 
found in Never Let Me Go, but the way in which arts and humanities are taught function 
to isolate characters from their social context rather than help them identify creative 
solutions to oppression.   
 These novels offer a concrete location for care ethics to investigate problems that 
could be solved by applying the values of care—attentiveness, responsibility, 
competence, and responsiveness—to individual, familial, social, and political issues. The 
narratives of each novel would be changed quite dramatically if there had been a location 
for the characters to voice their concerns over the uses of scientific technology. Care 
ethics can be advanced through civic discourses and democratic governance that start 
with empathy as a civic virtue. The novels examined here do not exhibit clear and easy 
critiques of the problems for care, and this analysis demonstrates that care ethics is not a 
simple, unconscious application of altruistic virtues of particular persons. Care is hard 
work. Sometimes it is physical work, although a political and social conception is often 
focused more on the values of care that can underwrite caring policies and just 
institutions. Citizens must be attentive, responsive, competent, and responsible in 
recognizing the particular needs for care that can be missed when we focus civic attention 
on rights and liberties alone. Some of these assumptions include the notion that our only 
responsibility is to keep our noses out of other persons’ business, which becomes an 
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effective excuse for inattentiveness. Responsiveness is typically thought of as someone 
else’s job, and with this conception of responsiveness, social responsibility is absolved.  
With a social and political care ethics approach, these negligent behaviors can be 
considered moral issues.  
This thesis also demonstrates that liberal justice-based theories are not adequate to 
addressing the range of possible implications of human cloning. As the cloning debate 
stands today, any unjust or oppressive circumstances that may arise from cloning will 
occur and be dealt with after-the-fact. Two of the novels analyzed here speculate that 
after-the-fact might be too late. I assert that if ethical discussion that involves only a 
rights framework is employed, this unacceptable reactive procedure will continue, and it 
will be unproductive.   
Care ethics in civic discourse can express the values and needs of real people who 
choose how they want to live within a conception of themselves as relationally and 
socially embedded. By bringing care out of the private realm and into the public realm, 
societies can promote active citizenship and recognize that instead of reacting to uncaring 
applications of human biotechnology, or any other area of public concern, through 
retroactive law and policy, we can find proactive solutions that are embedded in the 
contexts of actual lives that may be affected. In cases where oppressive or coercive 
actions may be a risk, we can address these potential issues in advance to lessen the 
impact of power relationships that affect how we care for ourselves and others. Rather 
than seeing the individual as opposed to government, as liberal theory does through its 
articulation of law as liberty-limiting, care ethics draws attention to how these boundaries 
drawn around ourselves as individuals only serve to deepen our isolation and our concept 
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of ourselves as different from other people we do not know, but whose lives affect ours in 
any case.  
Fukuyama’s assertion that we only know how to argue within a rights framework 
is called into serious doubt through this analysis of care ethics and the cloning debate. 
The language of care ethics is not heavily theoretical, nor is it unfamiliar or 
incomprehensible to our current way of life. In the context of care ethics, speculative 
fiction is a particularly interesting location from which to think critically about where 
science is taking our society. It is easy to dismiss these novels as far-fetched fantasies that 
represent extreme scenarios that could never happen in the real world; however, as 
Elshtain claims, when it comes to the issue of cloning “often the far-fetched gets us 
nearer the truth of the matter than all the cautious, persnickety pieces that fail to come 
anywhere close to the pity and terror this topic evokes” (183). While cloning seems an 
odd topic to investigate through a care ethics approach, it is an issue that bridges the 
conceptual gap between the individual, family, social, and political aspects of life. 
Cloning has the potential to affect everyone, and it is possible that it will happen within a 
context that disregards concerns of care. Considering the cloning debate through a care 
framework also shows how care ethics as a theory can move away from only 
considerations of carework, such as child care, elder-care, or health care. This 
consideration of cloning demonstrates the wide applicability of care ethics.  
Liberal political philosopher John Rawls writes at the end of The Law of Peoples 
(1999) that “if a reasonably just Society of Peoples whose members subordinate their 
power to reasonable aims is not possible, and human beings are largely amoral, if not 
incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile 
96 
 
 
for human beings to live on the earth” (128). It is my hope that where Rawls, and liberal 
theory in general fail, the ethics of care can intervene to promote a just and caring 
society. 
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